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The objective of this thesis is to research to what extent do the duties and powers 
conferred to the business rescue practitioner conflict with that of the directors during the 
business rescue proceedings since both of them form part of the management of the financially 
distressed company. In so doing, an analysis of the South African statutory provisions will be 
undertaken, followed by a probe into how those provisions can lead to the probable conflicts to 
be encountered between management and the practitioner, which can in turn considerably 
affect the effectiveness and success of the corporate reorganisation. In order to be able to find 
solutions to reduce possible conflicts, a juxtaposed analysis will be made with similarly 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis which occurred during the period of 2007 to 2009 led to a 
downturn of economic transactions which made the world economy collapse. The first remedial 
measure to curtail the detrimental effects was to prioritise the recovery of affected economies.1 
As an appropriate strategy, it has been proposed that financially perturbed companies should be 
placed under business rescue proceedings whereby all adopted policies will be converged 
towards the recuperation of the corporation’s financial position. The rescue stratagem was 
suggested because by definition the term rescue denotes a situation where the entity will be 
restructured in a manner to restore it to a profitable corporation.2 The rationale behind saving 
companies instead of liquidating them seems logical in the sense that if the entities remain in 
existence, jobs will be retained. With the employment level being maintained, the demand for 
consumption will be sustained, resulting in the production level growing proportionally which 
will in turn keep pace with the flow of economic activities which will render companies to be 
lucrative again and boost the economy in general. 
 
In furtherance of the facilitation of corporate rehabilitation, the expertise of a bankruptcy 
specialist is the most valuable. Consequently an insolvency professional, generally referred as 
business rescue practitioner (hereafter ‘practitioner’), is appointed during the reorganisation 
period so that he can apply his skills to the re-establishment of the financial health of the 
distressed company. In the United Kingdom, the culture is that an administrator, having the 
necessary insolvency skills, should be appointed to take over the control of the troubled 
business. In complete contrast, the United States of America supports that the specialist should 
only be hired in exceptional cases where the directors are not able to restore the liquidity 
position. As for South Africa, it has traditionally followed a system based on the English 
approach whereby a business rescue practitioner is employed to oversee and manage the affairs 
of the distressed company whilst the directors continue to manage the operations.3 
                                                 
1 J Jay Choi and MG Papaioannou ‘Financial Crisis and Risk Management: Reassessing The Asian Financial 
Crisis In Light Of The American Financial Crisis’ at 444, available at 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=ealr, accessed on 14 March 2016. 
2 FHI Cassim Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) at 861. 
3 J Rushworth ‘A critical analysis of the business rescue regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2010) Acta 
Juridica 375 at 388. 
It is worth noting that the obligation of the directors to continue trading will be covered in the parts 2.2 and 2.3 of 
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At first glance, it looks as though South Africa has incorporated a mechanism which 
takes the best of the dual systems of ‘debtor left in possession’ as applied in the United States 
of America and that of administration which is integrated in the English system. In such an 
approach, the directors are still involved at the operational level and can participate to a limited 
extent in strategic policy making, together with the practitioner administering the affairs of the 
company whenever it is required. The benefit of such a combined structure is that the 
knowledge and comprehension of the business from the directors along with the insolvency 
expertise of the practitioner significantly increase the prospect of an effective rescue regime.  
 
While aligning with the international development towards the divestment of 
management, the South African insolvency law has catered for the role of the administrator but 
has nevertheless put in place appropriate safeguards to curtail his abuse of authority and excess 
of corporate control.4 The South African Companies Act5 (hereafter ‘Act’) provides that the 
management retains the corporate control but the administrator has the upper hand as he is 
expected by the statute to have active participation in the operations and the supervision of the 
business. As a consequence, the directors will no longer be left the faculty of conducting their 
functions without any subordination of control.6 
 
1.1 Aim of the thesis 
When we look closely, it could be deduced that with a dual authorities system consisting 
of both executive officers and the practitioner forming part of management, there is likely to be 
frictions arising out of the situation, resulting in a potentially hostile collaboration between the 
two parties which can considerably affect the efficiency of the rescue strategy. Therefore this 
research project will analyse the question as to whether during the business rescue proceedings, 
the functions and privileges assigned to the practitioner can give rise to conflicts with respect to 
the duties and powers of the board of directors. Accordingly, this thesis will examine the extent 
to which the hybrid approach has being applied in South African law and what were the issues 
                                                 
4 R Bradstreet ‘The Leak in the Chapter 6 Lifeboat: Inadequate Regulation of the Business Rescue Practitioners 
May Adversely Affect Lenders’ Willingness and the Growth of the Economy’ (2010) 22 South African Mercantile 
Law Journal 195 at 212. 
5 Act 71 of 2008. 
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which may arise from such system, coupled with the subsequent recommendations being made 
based on a jurisdictional comparative study.  
 
1.2 Research Outline 
As the success of the rehabilitation process is significantly determined by the role of the 
insolvency professional,7 the thesis will look into the relevant statutory provisions in the first 
chapter. In juxtaposition, an analysis of the duties and powers of the directors during the rescue 
period will also be undertaken. The provisions of insolvent trading are also considered in 
Chapter 1 because even though the executive members are still required to undertake dealings 
during the reorganisation proceedings, there exists the possibility that they can be sued for 
continuing to transact while the company is facing severe financial difficulty, even if they have 
obtained the consent of the insolvency expert prior to undertakings. As mentioned earlier, 
during the corporate rescue phase, the management and the insolvency professional will have 
different degrees of authority which can result in a likelihood of agitations occurring between 
them. Respectively this thesis will analyse the difficulties which are expected to take place 
between the two parties in the subsequent chapter.  
 
Both company and insolvency law in South Africa are largely inspired from the English 
law, therefore it is useful to evaluate similar provisions to understand how the conflictive 
predicament has been eradicated between the parties in that jurisdiction. As another criterion 
for comparison, the provisions in Australia can be used to make recommendation as the country 
has an analogous system of administration to South Africa, apart from also being a 
Commonwealth jurisdiction.8 Further, the United States of America should be used as 
benchmark because the South African insolvency law has been significantly motivated by and 
derived from Chapter 11 of its’ Bankruptcy Code of 1978; and therefore it would be proper to 
make an analysis of its mechanisms. Thus in order to be able to probe appropriate solutions, in 
Chapter 3, we will make a comparative study with the aforementioned countries, namely 
Australia, United Kingdom and the United States regarding their provisions on the role, 
functions and prerogatives of the bankruptcy specialist and those of directors during the 
                                                 
7 R Bradstreet ‘The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink Or Swim? (2011) 128 South African Law Journal 
352 at 374. 
8 P Kloppers ‘Judicial Management-A Corporate Rescue Mechanism In Need Of Reform?’ (1999) 10 Stellenbosch 
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corporate restructuring period along with the provisions of insolvent trading. Based on a critical 
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2. Chapter 1: South African statutory provisions 
One of the purposes of the South African Companies Act as set out in the section 7(d)9  is 
to ensure the survival of the business,10 resulting in the protection of jobs which is an essential 
element in developing economies.11 Taking into account the societal benefits an effective 
restructuration procedure can bring, it has been felt that the assistance of an insolvency 
specialist would be appreciated in aiding the corporate recovery.12 Accordingly the Act 
provides for the appointment of practitioner who will takeover full corporate control during that 
period although the directors will continue to form part of the management.13 
 
The reasoning behind the substitution of control is that if a company becomes insolvent, 
it is possibly due to a directorial failure and therefore the same managers should no longer be 
entrusted with managerial responsibility.14 Hence, upon being aware that there is a situation of 
severe insolvency arising, management is required to duly assess whether it is a viable option 
to continue trading despite the financial distress.15 In the circumstances where it has been found 
that the directors were acting in bad faith, management can be punished for insolvent trading. 
However, it might occur that a company finds itself in acute trouble due to external factors 
even if the directors were not at fault and have carried out their duties diligently.16 
 
The objective of this thesis is to appreciate whether the role and prerogatives conferred 
by the South African Companies Act provisions to the practitioner conflict with the duties and 
powers of directors during the corporate reorganisation phase. Accordingly this chapter will 
cover the provisions of the Act in relation to the requirement of appointing a rescue practitioner 
coupled with the duties and powers of insolvent professional and management. Finally, the 
insolvent trading provisions will be explored. 
                                                 
9 The subsection provides that one of the purposes of the Act should be to reiterate the notion of business as a way 
to achieve economic and social benefits. 
10 Kloppers op cit (n8) 418. 
11 A Loubser ‘Business rescue in South Africa: a procedure in search of a home?’ 40 Comparative and 
International Law Journal of Southern Africa (2007) 152. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Section 137(2)(b). 
14 R Goode ‘Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law’ 3rd ed (2005) 328. 
15 JH Rochman ‘Outline of Proposed United Kingdom Insolvency Legislation’ (1985) 90 Commercial Law 
Journal 49 at 51. 
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2.1 Requirement to appoint a practitioner during business rescue 
Section 128(1)(b)(i) of the Act provides that in order to ease the corporate recuperation of 
a troubled company, business rescue proceedings must be initiated, entailing a short-term 
supervision and management of the business. The oversight necessitated for the company to be 
able to perform financially will be undertaken by an appointed practitioner who can be 
constituted of one person or more.17 The mode of the appointment of the practitioner depends 
on which party has applied for the restructuration process to be launched. In the event that the 
directors adjudicate that it is proper to place the company under rescue, they will have the 
privilege of choosing a consenting practitioner who should meet all the requisite 
qualifications.18 Alternatively, if an affected party has applied to court seeking a judicial order 
to have the rescue proceedings begin, upon positive findings, the court will appoint the 
practitioner provisionally.19 In this specific scenario, the choice of the interim practitioner will 
be designated by the aggrieved person who made the application, which needs to be 
substantiated by the approval of independent creditors.20 
 
The ability of the practitioner is greatly influenced by his professional qualification which 
will decide the fate and independence of a corporate reorganisation.21 In order to stabilise the 
financial health of an entity, it is a prerequisite that the practitioner has a bankruptcy 
background. Respectively, the practitioner should be in a legal, accounting or in a business 
management field and he should also be a member in good standing with a professional body 
as per the accreditation22 and licensing23 requirements of the Companies and Intellectual 
Property Commission (hereafter ‘Commission’). The practitioner should not be subject to any 
disqualification from acting as a director of the entity24 or have been imposed a probation order 
subsequent to not carrying out his duties correctly as director of the company previously.25 He 
should also not be related to any person who was disqualified for not undertaking his directorial 
                                                 
17 Section 128(1)(b). 
18 Section 129(3)(b). 
19 Section 131(5). 
20 Section 131(5). 
21 Bradstreet op cit (n7) 374. 
22 Section 138(1)(a). 
23 Section 138(1)(b). 
24 Section 138(1)(d). 
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duties properly in the company.26 Most importantly, the practitioner need not have any kind of 
affinity with the business which might give the impression to any person that his integrity, 
impartiality and objectivity have been compromised.27 
 
2.1.1 Duties of the practitioner 
The main aim of engaging a company in business rescue proceedings is to reorganise the 
corporate affairs by developing and adopting a rescue plan which will increase the possibility 
for the company to continue trading in the foreseeable future.28 Thus it can be deduced that the 
primary duty of the insolvency practitioner is to put in place the best strategies after 
consultation with the relevant stakeholders so as to ensure that he succeeds in efficiently 
improving the financial position of the entity. The Act provides that if the rescue proceeding 
has not ceased within three months from its initiation, the practitioner is required to give a 
report on the advancement of the process until it comes to an end.29 
 
In the next subsections, we will scrutinise the duties of the bankruptcy expert relating to 
his reporting obligations, the strategies to be implemented and the commitment to exercise his 
performances in good faith and with an expected degree of care, skill and due diligence. 
 
2.1.1.1 Reporting to relevant authorities and investigation in the scope of the rescue 
Upon employment, the practitioner has the obligation to inform all relevant regulatory 
authorities that the business is placed under rescue procedures.30 Afterwards, he is required to 
inquire into the assets and financial situation of the business as soon as it is suitable to do so.31 
Subsequent to such examination, he must assess whether there is a reasonable chance of the 
company being rescued following a prospective restructuring strategy.32 If at any time he 
concludes that there is no possibility of a corporate recovery, the practitioner must respectively 
inform the court and all affected persons about the situation.33 Also, as stated above, it is 
                                                 
26 Section138(1)(f). 
27 Section 138(1)(e). 
28 Section 128(1)(b)(iii). 
29 Section 132(3)(a). 
30 Section 140(1)(A). 
31 Section 141(1). 
32 Section 141 (2)(a). 
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anticipated from the practitioner to provide a regular update on the evolution of the 
proceedings. A supplementary duty is imposed on the practitioner, who after his appointment is 
considered as an officer of the court, to report to the judicial institution about the extent to 
which the court order and rules made have been applied.34 
 
2.1.1.2 Designing the rescue scheme and promoting interest of stakeholders 
 In order to administer the corporate operations, the practitioner will have to develop and 
implement a business rescue plan which he will have to follow.35 The practitioner is entrusted 
with the responsibility of designing the scheme36 after consultation with all affected 
stakeholders regarding their views and benefits. This exigency goes in line with the fact that the 
business rescue proceedings should be undertaken in such a way that the rights and interests of 
relevant parties are balanced in accordance with the section 7(k) of the Act.37 Thus, although 
the practitioner is appointed mainly to protect the interests of the creditors, he is expected to 
take into account the interests of other stakeholders.  
 
The Act has put in place another statutory provision corroborates with the stakeholder 
inclusivity approach by stipulating that any aggrieved party may apply for a court order 
demanding that the practitioner to equilibrate the various participants’ viewpoints by requiring 
him to provide security with terms and amount depending on court determination.38 The 
imposition of security has been an imbedded principle of the South African insolvency law 
compelling that judicial manager or trustee, and in our case, the practitioner who in the similar 
position, to provide such guarantee.39 This notion is reiterated as an outcome of the wide 
powers and position of trust which the practitioner holds.40 In fact the King Code41 suggests 
that the appointed practitioner should provide security amounting to the value of the corporate 
assets.42 
 
                                                 
34 Section 140(3)(a). 
35 Rushworth op cit (n3) 393. 
36 Section 140(1)(d). 
37 A Loubser ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions (Part 1)’ 
(2010) South African Law Journal 501. 
38 Section 130(1)(c). 
39 Loubser op cit (n37) 508. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Institute of Directors ‘King Code of Governance for South Africa’ (2009), recommendation 2.15.4. 
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If there are remote chances for the entity to recover financially, the practitioner should, as 
a last resort, at least target to generate a better return at least for the creditors or for the 
shareholders than what would have been obtained as a consequence of an immediate 
liquidation.43 Hence the practitioner should do his best to maintain the company’s value so that 
one or both of these stakeholders groups are not put at a colossal disadvantage. If the corporate 
reputation is preserved, the capital gain and dividend of the shareholders will be maintained. As 
for the creditors, if the goodwill is maintained, the life of the company will be prolonged and 
they will benefit in terms of an increased likelihood for them to get back their investment. 
 
2.1.1.3 Same duties as directors 
The duties of the practitioner are more onerous than those of the directors since he has to 
carry out the obligations of the managers in addition to his own set of responsibilities due to the 
management displacement.44 For that reason, section 140(3)(b) of the Act stipulates that the 
practitioner has the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of a director of the company in 
accordance with sections 75, 76 and 77 of the Act with regard to personal financial interests, 
standards of conduct and certain liabilities.  
 
Like management, the practitioner will be expected to disclose at any time any of his 
personal financial interest.45 Similarly, section 76 specifies that the practitioner should not 
consciously cause harm to the business.46 It is further stipulated by the same provision that the 
practitioner is mandated to carry out his tasks in good faith,47 in the best interests of the 
company.48 He is additionally instructed to apply an expected degree of care, skill and 
diligence when performing his functions as would be anticipated by another practitioner having 
the same knowledge and expertise.49 The practitioner is also statutorily prescribed to rely on the 
performance and advice of other specialists unless he has reasonable grounds to suspect that it 
would not be wise to depend on such judgement.50 
                                                 
43 Section 128(1)(b)(iii). 
44 Rushworth op cit (n3) 393. 
45 Section 75. 
46 Section 76(2)(a)(ii). 
47 Section 76(3)(a). 
48 Section 76(3)(b). 
49 Section 76(3)(c). 
50 Section 76(4)(b) and (5). 
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Given the extensive powers of the practitioner, it stands to reason that he should be 
correspondingly accountable for his actions;51 and thus he should strictly abide by his duties 
with the requisite level. But it has been submitted that the standards of duties for practitioners 
should be lower than the ones imposed on directors with respect to the same duties since a high 
threshold would prevent the practitioner from taking certain necessary decisions outside the 
functional scope of a manager.52 
 
2.1.2 Powers of Practitioners 
Since the corporate managerial prerogatives change hands from the existing management 
to the practitioner,53 the latter will be empowered to exercise his authority with respect to the 
transactions of the business, the dismissal of directors and appointment of officers. In the 
following subsections we will look into these powers together with the repercussions which can 
be occasioned if they are abused. 
 
2.1.2.1 Removal and Appointment and of directors and officers. 
The practitioner is vested with the power to dismiss any individual who is part of 
management and is subsequently entitled to appoint any person to fill this or any other 
vacancy.54 But these appointments cannot be made with respect to a person who has any other 
relationship with the business or who is related to persons having a corporate relationship with 
the entity cannot be employed because of people’s perception of him being biased.55 
 
The entitlements of the practitioner would also comprise of him having the capacity to 
assign any of his powers or functions to an individual who forms or previously formed part of 
management.56 This privilege upholds the provision that a director must exercise his functions 
subject to the practitioner's authority;57 implying that the practitioner is the one with ultimate 
                                                 
51 Bradstreet op cite (n4) 209. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Section 140(1)(a). 
54 Section 140(1)(c). 
55 Section 140(2). 
56 Section 140(1)(b). 
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control over the management.58 However it is not clear whether the substitution of control 
would mean a full divestment of management.59 
 
2.1.2.2 Approval and abuse of powers of the practitioner 
It is stated by the Act that no legal or enforcement proceedings can be initiated against 
the company’s assets except if the practitioner agreed in writing that such remedy can be 
sought.60 Thus the practitioner should judiciously appreciate when it will be wise to give his 
approval because as per the section 134(2)(b) of the Act, the practitioner should not withhold 
his consent unreasonably, with respect to the circumstances of the company. If it is proved that 
the refusal from the practitioner to give his consent is unjustified, it can be construed to be a 
misuse of his discretion. As such, preventive measures have been provided to control the wide 
powers in the form of section 77 which specifies that a practitioner may be liable under the 
common law for any loss sustained by the company as a consequence of a breach of his duty, 
which can also result in a delictual claim. Therefore the practitioner will be punished for gross 
negligence or bad faith emanating from the exercise of his performances.61 
 
Liability can still be asserted in the event the practitioner had been an accepting and 
contracting party to transactions which have been dealt by a person who acted outside his 
authority or had intention to defraud, or whereby the activities were undertaken recklessly. It 
should be noted that the appointed practitioners will be jointly and severally liable altogether 
for the same action. However, the practitioner may exonerate himself by proving that he acted 
honestly and reasonably, and taking into account the circumstances of the case. He can also 
seek protection under the business judgement rule as provided by the section 76(4) of the Act 
(the rule will be explained in section 2.3.2 of the dissertation). But if there are no reasonable 
grounds to justify the gross mismanagement by insolvency practitioner, under such 
circumstances he may be removed from office. 
 
                                                 
58 Bradstreet op cit (n4) 200. 
59 Bradstreet op cit (n4) 199. 
60 Section 133(1)(a). 
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2.1.2.3 Removal of practitioner 
By way of application to the court by an aggrieved person, if it is arbitrated that it is 
appropriate to set aside the company’s resolution regarding the initiation of the business rescue 
proceedings or that the aptitude of the practitioner is defective, the judicial institution will order 
the revocation of the appointed practitioner.62 A practitioner can be dismissed on various 
grounds, namely of incompetency, his engagement in illegal doings,63 or his inability to 
perform requisite functions and the unlikelihood to regain that capacity within a reasonable 
time.64  He can also be removed on the basis that he does not satisfy the requirements of section 
13865 which will imply that he is no more a member of a professional body which is accredited 
by the Commission, he has been the subject of a probation order, he has been disqualified from 
being a director or he has an affinity of a conflictive nature with the entity.66 The practitioner 
can also be dismissed for cause that he is not independent to management.67 
 
The removal of the practitioner can be executed for failure to exercise his duties 
properly68 or incapability to perform his duties with the required degree of care69 or simply 
because he lacks the necessary skills to act with respect to the company’s circumstances.70 It 
has been defended that if it is vital for the practitioner to have certain specific requisite skills, it 
should be set out as a pre-condition at the outset of the appointment and not after his 
appointment, as his competence will determine the success of the rescue plan.71 Nonetheless, 
with a multitude of grounds for dismissal, it is relatively easy to remove the practitioner and 
this is why it is proper to entrust the court with this responsibility.72 Hence it can be deduced 
that the practitioner will be subject to the control of the court; and according to the judiciary, he 
is expected to act impartially and honestly73 or otherwise he can be removed from his post. In 
                                                 
62 Section 130(6). 
63 Section 139(2)(c). 
64 Section 139(2)(f). 
65 Section 130(1)(b)(i). 
66 Section 139(2)(e). 
67 Section 130(1)(b)(ii). 
68 Section 139(2)(a). 
69 Section 139(2)(b). 
70 Section 130(1)(b)(iii). 
71 Loubser op cit (n37) 507. 
72 Bradstreet op cit (n4) 208. 
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fact in the cases of Ex p James74 and Re British American Racing (Holdings) Ltd75, the court 
adjudicated that ‘the conduct of the practitioner can be opened to review by it’.76 
 
In case the practitioner dies, resigns or his appointment is revoked, the oversight of the 
business is being substituted by a new practitioner.77 As replacement, an alternate practitioner 
who meets all requisite specifications will be appointed subject to the recommendation or 
consent of the majority of independent creditors’ voting interests which have been represented 
to the court.78 This provision is supported on the assumption that creditors will be represented 
which might not be the case since they can be reluctant to incur the resulting costs.79 Further, it 
is worth noting that in the instance where there is no representation of creditors’ interests,80 
there is no substituted inclusion of shareholders or employees to be represented.  
 
2.2 Role of directors during business rescue 
The existing management is not automatically removed during the rescue proceedings81 
and hence has to perform some residual functions. These duties do not constitute part of the 
decision making and control, except and to the extent the practitioner has delegated such 
prerogatives.82 
 
2.2.1 Duties of directors 
As the directors are still employed as the agents of the entity, they are still bound by the 
fiduciary duty, requiring them to act in the best interests of the company. Also, irrespective of 
the solvency situation of a corporation, the executive officers are expected to manage the 
business in such a way so as to promote high standards of corporate governance as per the 
section 7(b)(iii) of the Act, which is mainly founded under the principle of balancing the 
various stakeholders interests. Also, there are certain criteria which are to be respected by the 
managers when performing their functions, such as applying a requisite degree of due care, 
                                                 
74 (1874) 9 Ch App 609. 
75 [2005] 2 BCLC 234 (Ch D) 248f. 
76 Cassim op cit (n2) 889. 
77 Section 139(3). 
78 Section 130(6)(a). 
79 Loubser op cit (n37) 507. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Loubser op cit (n37) 502. 
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diligence and skill. However the degree of commitment to these duties is reduced 
correspondingly to the extent to which the functions have been taken away from these officers 
during the rescue proceedings. The obligations of the directors during the reorganisation phase 
will be covered below. 
 
2.2.1.1 Duty as officers of the company and protection of the interests of stakeholders 
There is no settled agreement about the basis of the legal relationship between 
management and the company.83 Some have opined that directors are the managing partners84 
and they are thus empowered with the capacity to manage the financial affairs of the business85 
whilst others would view the managers as being the agents, more particularly as trustees.86 It is 
implicitly understood that these officers are required to undertake both roles simultaneously. As 
trustees of the company, the directors are anticipated to perform their duties with the sole aim 
of benefitting the troubled entity.87 In the same fashion the corporate assets should be utilised 
to maximise the returns of the business.88 In fact, in practice, the executives usually adopt the 
enlightened shareholder value approach which still focuses strongly on profit maximising.89 
However it is recommended by the regulatory framework of King Code III that a stakeholder 
inclusivity attitude is more suitable for companies, whether they are financially distressed or 
not.90 
 
All companies incorporated and resident in South Africa have to follow the King Code III 
guidelines on corporate governance.91 Accordingly the managers of all entities, irrespective of 
the liquidity status, should practice sound corporate governance as a way to sustain growth in 
the future.92 It is worth noting that the compliance of the Code is strictly required for 
companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange; and those entities which are not listed, 
the institution cannot do much to enforce the principles stipulated. The report accentuates that 
directors should take appropriate measures to overcome the financial difficulty during the 
                                                 
83 Cassim R Contemporary Company Law 2ed (2012) at 412. 
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87 Cassim op cit (n83) 412. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Cassim op cit (n83) 495. 
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business rescue proceedings.93 The King III Report adopted the triple bottom line approach 
which consists of operating the company in a manner where appropriate responsibility is 
accounted for economically, socially and environmentally.94 It is further advocated by the 
framework that the executive officers should adopt a stakeholder inclusive approach95 which 
recognises the possible benefits to be generated for a large group of affected parties in the long 
run.96 Thus it can be said that corporate governance is one of the measures which can assess the 
competency of management.97 
 
However, it can be commented that directors who are still employed by the company, 
should focus on protecting the interests of the corporation by safeguarding the rights of the 
shareholders. In this regard, in the case of Percival v Wright,98 the court coined the principle 
that a director only owes a fiduciary duty towards his company and not to anyone else. 
However, the South African Appellate Division observed in Sammel v President Brand Gold 
Mining Co Ltd99 that when the business is insolvent, management should focus on the rights 
and interests of the creditor instead of the shareholders. In spite of this, it was not customary for 
the South African courts to impose a duty on directors to act in the interests of creditors, 
irrespective of the insolvency situation.100 But it has been long advocated that directors should 
specifically owe a fiduciary duty to creditors when a company is found in an insolvent 
position.101 It was strongly argued by some that the fiduciary duty towards the creditors has 
persisted throughout the life of the company, regardless of the corporate financial health in the 
disguise of managers having the responsibility to account for stakeholders’ viewpoint and 
wishes (including creditors) before taking a decision.102 
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2.2.1.2 Duty of care, skill and diligence 
During the proceedings, the directors still need to comply with the requirements 
concerning personal financial interests.103 Section 76(2)(a)(i) of the Act describes that 
management should avoid having a conflict of duty and personal interests with the company.104 
To the extent that the executive officers carry out managerial functions subject to the direction 
of the practitioner where applicable, they are exempted from abiding by the general standards 
required for directors' conduct in accordance with section 76 and from liabilities as listed in 
section 77 with the exception of sections 77(3)(a), (b) and (c)105 regarding the duty of care, skill 
and diligence. The nature of the duties of good faith, loyalty and of reasonable care and skills 
are ‘mandatory, prescriptive and unalterable’ from which the directors cannot contract out.106 
The objective of this high benchmarking is to raise the standards of corporate and directorial 
behaviour.107 It can be noted that the South African provisions on the duties of directors were 
significantly inspired by English precedents of the late 1800s and early 1900s.108  
 
The South African courts adopted a conservative approach towards directors' duty of 
care, skill and diligence whereby the case which was adjudicated in 1980, Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgensen,109 is still the leading case on the subject. The 
case identified the principle that the application of these duties will depend considerably on the 
nature of the company's business and on the degree to which the director has been assigned a 
particular obligation. The judges also remarked that a director need not be equipped with a 
special business acumen or to have appropriate experience in the business of the company, but 
should exercise due care to the extent which can reasonably be expected of a person having the 
same knowledge and experience as him. Also the director is not liable for mere errors of 
judgment. In addition, the court noted that a director is required to trust that other officers are 
doing their job correctly unless they have reasonable justifications for suspecting the opposite. 
Therefore it means that the director is bound to rely on the information, judgement and advice 
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of the relevant professionals, unless there are reasonable grounds for questioning same. It can 
hence be concluded he is entitled to accept data and advice after due consideration. 
 
Since the standard to which a director is expected to live up to, is subjective to someone 
occupying the same role and having similar knowledge and expertise, in case of litigation, the 
court will have to determine beforehand what will be the exact parameters of the standards to 
be set.110 According to the value judgement of the court, the judicial institution will be able to 
assess whether the conduct of the manager was proper.111 
 
2.2.1.3 Documentary records 
Management is required to respond to every query of the practitioner at all times during 
the proceedings; in particular they should provide information about the company's financial 
position112 by arranging for all relevant documentary records as soon as the proceedings are 
initiated.113 In this concern, the statement of affairs will help the practitioner to assess the 
business’ financial condition and assist him in the development of the business rescue plan.114 
Additionally, the directors should update the practitioner about the whereabouts of the 
documentary evidences.115 
 
In case the proceedings have not yet been started, and the practitioner deduces from 
evidences that there were voidable transactions or a failure by the directors to perform any 
material corporate obligation, he must instruct the executive officers to take any requisite 
remedial measures.116 If there is proof that there has been reckless trading, he must order 
management to take any necessary steps to rectify the matter and he should instantaneously 
forward the evidence to the appropriate authority for further investigation whereby the 
possibility of prosecution may be entailed.117 
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2.2.2 Powers of directors 
The managers no longer have discretionary privileges but they still have residual powers 
left. Even if their powers may be restricted by the insolvency’s expert authority, the officers 
will still attend the board meetings, and be involved at operational and strategic level. 
 
2.2.2.1 Continue to trade and still involved in the decision making process 
The officers comprising of the pre-rescue management, continue to trade on a daily basis. 
But the approval of practitioner is required, wherever it is reasonable to have his consent so that 
certain transactions can be undertaken by the director. Thus the dealings will be valid only 
upon the permission of the rescue expert, absent which they will be void.118 
 
The managers can be conferred additional entitlements than usual, subject to the 
delegation of the practitioner’s powers,119 in which seems to vary from a scenario to another 
one. Thus, the degree of participation of directors in the strategic policy formulation will be 
contingent on the instruction of the practitioner.120 Consequently it can be argued that the 
directors might not impact on decisions taken if they have a passive role by only attending the 
meetings but are not entitled to a say. 
 
2.2.2.2 Liability of directors 
As discussed earlier, the directors are still required to abide by the duties listed in the 
section 77(3). Therefore in case the officers failed to perform their functions correctly in this 
respect, they might face an order declaring the executive to be delinquent which might in turn 
to the disqualification and dismissal from office.121 
 
The liability of the directors subsists in the scenario where costs are incurred by the 
company as a result of a director carrying out any dealings or actions on behalf of the company 
despite knowing that he does not have the requisite capacity.122 Management will still be liable 
for any damages caused if it acquiesced undertaking business recklessly, with gross negligence, 
                                                 
118 Section 137(4). 
119 Section 137(2)(a) 
120 Rushworth op cit (n3) 392. 
121 Cassim op cit (n83) 432. 




 Research Project: Ashirah B. Kaudeer 
for any fraudulent motive or with the mental aim of defrauding any individual.123 Liability will 
come also be into play if a director has participated in any action or omission where he had 
knowledge that the nature of the dealing is for fraudulent purposes and has resulted in the 
business sustaining losses.124 
 
2.2.2.3 Removal from office 
By way of application to the court, any affected person125 or the practitioner can remove a 
director on the basis that the latter failed to satisfy the requirements of Chapter 6 of the 
Companies Act regarding the provisions of business rescue126 or has impeded the practitioner 
to perform his duties127 or prevented the latter from managing the business correctly.128 
 
2.3 Insolvent trading 
During the rescue process, directors maintain the operations but often some of the 
dealings might be of a risky nature; and as a consequence, the assent of the practitioner will be 
needed in order to proceed with such undertakings. It can be perceived by third parties that the 
directors are being reckless and negligent by transacting when they should instead refrain from 
trading during the time the entity is facing severe solvency difficulties. Thus, even after 
obtaining the accord of the practitioner, it might occur that directors are prosecuted for 
insolvent trading. In this regard, it is important to consider the provisions of the Act on the 
topic.  
 
Herzberg is of the opinion that the aim of the insolvent trading provisions is to ensure that 
management stops trading promptly and initiates proceedings when it is reasonably felt that the 
business can no longer pay its current expenses as and when they fall due.129 In South Africa, 
section 22(1)(a) of the Act provides that a business should not undertake any dealings 
recklessly, with gross negligence or with the intention to defraud any individual. Additionally, 
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the Section 22(1)(b) stipulates that an entity is not required to trade under insolvent 
circumstances.  
 
Sections 77(3)(b) and (c) reiterate section 214 of the Act by stating that a director could 
be held liable if he was aware that a fraudulent action which was initiated would subsequently 
lead to a loss for the company.130 Even if the executive officer is not aware of the legal 
consequences of the process of the dealings but knew that the conclusion of the transactions 
would be carried out fraudulently, the director will still be liable.131 In order to prove the 
fraudulent nature of the activities, the plaintiff should prove the causal link that the loss 
suffered was an outcome of the reckless trading.132 The aggrieved parties face who want to 
seek remedy in terms of this principle, encounter procedural and substantive difficulties in 
proving their case.133 The greatest problem experienced by creditors is that they have a 
considerable onus in convincing the court that at the time the particular debt was incurred, there 
were no reasonable grounds to expect that the company could repay the current expenses.134 To 
prove the inability of the business to pay its debts, these creditors should rely on records of the 
company, such as the financial statements and the cash flow position which can be obtained 
with the assistance of management, who is the party the creditors are suing.135 
 
2.3.1 Penalties 
An action to determine the liability of management can be initiated by any aggrieved 
party who suffered any damages as a result of transactions being undertaken negligently.136 The 
penalty is normally the civil consequence which will be entailed, similarly to any breach of the 
Act’s provisions.137 In fact section 424 of the Companies Act provides that personal liability on 
directors can be imposed if the latter took cognisance of any fraudulent action or intention. But 
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it is provided by the Act that both civil and criminal liabilities are imposed on the directors with 
respect to the same prohibited actions. 
 
2.3.2 Remedies 
In Carbon Developments,138 the then Appellate Division remarked that insolvent trading 
can easily happen and should not be treated as a societal crime. Hence, directors are duly 
expected to perpetuate trading if it is proper to do so and they can justify that their decision was 
well thought out, even if the risk of worsening the insolvency phase can engender their 
liability.139 It had been argued that if there has been no intention to defraud emanating from the 
directors, there is no justification for the business to cease trading whilst being factually 
insolvent.140 
 
Another defence which can be available to the managers who are accused of insolvent 
trading is to rely on the business judgement rule. South Africa has established its particular 
version of the business judgement rule,141 often also referred as the safe harbor provision which 
has been incorporated in section 76(4) of the Act.  In order to have recourse to this remedy, 
management should show that it has taken all necessary measures to be informed about the 
matter in question;142 that it or a related party has no personal interest has a personal interest in 
the matter.143  Management also needs to prove that it has taken decision based on the opinion 
of a designated expert.144 It is to be noted that the application of the rule applies to not only to 
business decisions and judgement which means that the rule extends its’ protection to directors 
with respect to any decisions, even if the strategy adopted has a disastrous impact on the 
company.145 But such a shield would not apply in the case of reckless trading or where 
fraudulent intention can be largely proved.146 
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In addition section 77(9) of the Act stipulates that a director may be spared liability by 
the court in any proceedings if it appears that he has acted honestly and reasonably and took 
into account the circumstances of the case.147 Therefore if there is evidence that the directors 
acted in good faith, without being bias by any personal benefits and have only considered what 
is in the best interest of the company, they might seek to defend themselves in terms of this 
provision. But if the court finds that one of the requirements has not been met, the rule will be 
of no use and the director will be considered to be liable.148 
 
In the event the executive officers have incurred supplementary debts when the entity 
was on the verge of bankruptcy, the Court will take into account some factors in determining 
the bad faith and mischievous intent of the officers. In the case of Philotex v Snyman,149 it was 
highlighted that some of pertinent elements to be considered whilst trading in factually 
insolvent circumstances are the clarity, commitment, extent and duration of future source of 
funding before incurring additional debt. The listed components will guide the insolvent 
company on how to suitably achieve a practical and commercial solution.150 
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3. Chapter 2: Conflicts between the practitioner and 
directors 
This Chapter will address the issues which may arise with respect to the directors still 
forming part of management during the rescue proceedings whilst the practitioner has ultimate 
directorial control. The major cause of frictions between the two parties is likely to result from 
lack of co-ordination which is traditionally influenced by diverging interests, perceptions and 
motivations on the side of each party.151 The following sections will analyse the various 
reasons why conflicts can arise between the directors and the practitioner. 
 
3.1 Use of information 
Essentially practitioners should possess the requisite expertise in insolvency matters 
including laws and processes relating to corporate restructuring. However, even though they 
keep abreast of changes in insolvency law and turnaround strategies, they do not have a 
thorough comprehension of the internal processes and any particular company’s activities.152 
Mayson opines that since the rescue practitioner has to take over the management and oversight 
of the business, information should be provided to him.153 The appropriate source would be the 
officers of the company who are well acquainted with the business, its history and its culture.154 
Having access to such information would enable the bankruptcy expert to prepare a substantive 
rescue plan which will be proposed to the creditors based on the data provided.155 However, a 
predicament which the administrator might face is that at times a large amount of information 
might be required within a short timeline which will not feasible for the directors to respond 
appropriately due to time constraint.156 
 
It can be contended that although information and assistance of directors are provided to 
the practitioner, the construal of the data will be subjective to him, which may imply the 
possibility of misunderstanding. Despite knowing the inherent corporate environment, 
management cannot pressurise the practitioner to follow a specific line of thought since it has 
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an inferior and passive role at the strategic level. Thus a diverging interpretation between 
management and the practitioner can result in a misapprehension between them. 
 
The difficulty is compounded if information is required from a larger circle of actors.157 
Too much information from too many parties can lead to confusion and important records 
being ignored whilst less relevant documentary evidence is given undue consideration. Another 
intricacy associated with the unsound flow of data, occurs when there is a wide and diverse 
range of interests to be taken into account and each protagonist, who has a specific incentive 
and objective in trying to restructure the business, will be tempted to provide their own input 
accordingly.158 This unwarranted concern is amplified when these different parties project the 
materials in a way to entice the specialist to comprehend information in a manner which is 
beneficial to their interests. 
 
With different priorities from various parties, it is anticipated that there will be clashes 
and distortions which will affect the exchange of information. Consequently the resulting 
communication difficulties will affect the ability and commitment of management and the 
practitioner to co-operate amongst themselves in order to reach to a proper outcome.159 
Collaboration between the two parties can be facilitated by discussing about the probable 
intentions of the various parties from which information have been obtained so as to avoid any 
misconceptions which could have hindered the flow of information generating from directors160 
resulting in a potentially effective rescue regime.161 
 
3.2 Divergence in priorities 
To rehabilitate the financial situation of the distressed entity, the Act expects the 
practitioner to prioritise the benefits of creditors or shareholders by maximising their returns as 
provided by Section 128(1)(b)(iii) of the Act. Respectively, the practitioner will perceive that 
protection of corporate assets should be one of the priorities. As discussed earlier, in the event 
rescue proceedings are initiated by an affected party, the appointment of practitioner is 
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determined significantly by the approval of creditors. In this line of reasoning, the practitioner 
is more likely to promote the interests of creditors. It is further to be noted that the section 
mentions to prioritise the interests of either creditors or shareholders, but not both of them. 
Thus there is no guarantee that the wishes of the owners of the company will be considered 
since they are not involved in the appointment process. It can be argued that since directors are 
employed with the main duty of promoting the interests of the company through the protection 
of the shareholders benefits, they can be annoyed if the creditors are given preference by the 
practitioner. It can be argued that management can retaliate by way of arguments or pressure of 
not collaborating unless the rights of the shareholders are safeguarded. 
 
It can be submitted that there is no assurance that the interests of the creditors will be 
protected if the interests of the shareholders are prioritised. But as per the section 7(k) of the 
Act, the efficient rescue and recovery of financially troubled business should be undertaken in a 
way which balances the rights and wishes of all relevant affected parties.162 Thus, it might be 
argued that even though there is no express specified duty which has been imposed on the 
practitioner to adopt a stakeholder inclusive approach, it is implicitly understood that he is 
required to consider the well-being of other stakeholders, including that of creditors. 
 
On the other hand, according to section 7(b)(iii) of the Act directors should endeavour to 
protect the welfare of the company together with taking into consideration the interests of other 
affected groups of people. In the same line goes the principles of the King Code III163 which 
recommend management to take a stakeholder inclusive approach. Respectively, one of the 
parties to whom management owes a duty is the creditors. It has been commented that directors 
owe a fiduciary duty to creditors only when the business is on the verge of insolvency.164 Given 
that management has to ensure that the interests of all affected group of stakeholders are 
protected irrespective of the corporate financial health as per the King Code and the Act, it 
implicitly means that the views and rights of creditors should be safeguarded anytime during 
the lifetime of the business.165 Thus if the practitioner ignores the interests of the creditors, the 
board of directors may find it difficult to abide by the duty to promote the interests of this 
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particular stakeholder group since its’ actions are subject to the approval of the practitioner. 
The directors failing to perform their duties correctly due to the practitioner, might be induced 
to be uncooperative. 
 
Under the threat of penalisation by the monitoring authority, administrators are reluctant 
to make use of their discretion when making decisions.166 Appropriate judgement made by the 
practitioner by using his acquired bankruptcy skills would benefit all relevant stakeholders.167 
Not making use of this prerogative will defeat the purpose of appointing an expert having the 
insolvency skills which management does not possess.168 The practitioner being hesitant to use 
his discretion to take prompt measures can lead to an inefficient rescue regime.169 It has been 
submitted that the returns of creditors are maximised when there is undue delay in taking 
decisions.170 The quicker the response and remedial measures are taken to rehabilitate the 
distressed entity, the quicker the recovery will be.171 It must be noted that delay can reduce the 
value of the company’ assets which is left for the distribution to creditors.172 As the directors 
are the one having all the information and know-how readily available, conveniently, they 
should be significantly involved in the policy making process to save the business from going 
bankrupt by taking quick and appropriate decisions.173 But if the practitioner does not permit 
the managers to have an active role in the process, there is a risk that the corporate 
reorganisation will end up unsuccessful. 
 
Nonetheless it was refuted that by leaving the entire corporate management to directors 
during insolvency would tempt them to continue to use their discretion to devise perilous 
tactics which can prove to be unfavorable to the owners of the company.174 Shareholders 
customarily do not need a report of decisions taken on a daily basis but only expect the 
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directors to use their expertise to maximise their return on investment.175 By taking risky 
decisions, the managers will not be the one at a loss but may in fact even gain by speculative 
investment of the business’ assets.176 Moreover, with the managers left in control, they may 
attempt to do take any measures to preserve their jobs during the rescue regime177 which might 
not automatically be in the interests of the shareholders and the other stakeholders. It can be 
said that maintaining the wide scope of prerogatives of directors can incentivise them to act in 
without due care again since they can easily seek refuge under the discretionary powers.178 
Thus, with the practitioner who has the faculty of curtailing any abuse of powers of 
management, directors will be hesitant to make inappropriate discretionary use of their 
privileges. 
 
3.3 Too many actors’ points of view 
Business rescue proceedings normally entail multi-actors processes involving the 
collection of data, and the formulation and implementation of strategies which most probably 
will run serious risks of confusions, delays and uncertainties during the period. This section 
will elaborate on the various protagonists involved in the restructuration process. 
 
Due appreciation should be given to acknowledge that the management may have 
personal motives for controlling the flow of data during the proceedings, as mentioned above. 
It might be contended that directors while trying to keep their job, will be tempted to present 
only positive information or to window dress the data so as to influence the practitioner in a 
manner which will be advantageous to them.179 Directors can have recourse to the manipulation 
of certain accounting valuations which are based on variables and contingent events; and thus 
there is no guarantee that the amounts reflected in the records provided to the practitioner are 
correct and accurate.180 Management might even consider maintaining uncertainty with regards 
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to the business financial situation upon which the administrator will delay the decision making 
process.181 
 
During the proceedings, the directors might be unsure about the intention of the 
practitioner by believing that the latter will be motivated to keep significant creditors such as 
banks happy rather than pursuing the corporate rescue. This sentiment is backed by the 
perception that the administrators will be employed recurrently in the insolvency field and 
since banks are the major providers of finance, they will have a say and significant influence on 
the choice of practitioner to be appointed.182 To ensure their employment, practitioners will 
endeavour to maintain a cordial rapport with the institutional banks.183 Therefore there may be 
doubts that the practitioner being induced to keep banks satisfied instead of focusing on the 
restructuration of the company.184 
 
Banks play an important role in the rescue of distressed companies since the plans which 
the administrator intends to propose will be based on strategies which will require so called 
post-commencement finance.185 In exchange of financial assistance to fund restructuring 
projects, these prospective fund providers will only be agreeable186 to help by exercising their 
powers to impose terms and conditions on financing by restricting rearranged borrowing 
agreements, the operating activities, new investments, sale of assets, disbursements to 
shareholders, financial activities and the benchmark of accounting ratios which should be met 
by the corporation.187 The attention of the practitioner will tend to be geared towards meeting 
these targets so as to obtain finance which may make the directors conceive that the 
practitioner’s focus on the reorganisation priorities will be significantly compromised. 
Consequently, management might be reluctant to help the practitioner. 
 
In another viewpoint, in order to have a detailed comprehension on nearly all aspects of 
the company and its business, the practitioner will tend to reach out to independent sources of 
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information such as banks which possess valuable data.188 The banks are likely to provide a 
significant amount of stored data regarding the financial and operational aspect of the 
corporation.189 There is a risk that these institutional lenders might influence the information by 
providing tactical data to the practitioner to promote their interests rather than that of other 
creditors of the company.190 It can be debated that banks may be motivated to manipulate 
evidence to demonstrate an impractical rescue option191 whereby their help would be 
indispensable. 
 
On a shareholder perspective, there is huge pressure from the owners of the company to 
remove the directors from the company if the officers do not promote their interests during the 
time when the entity is in a financially distressed position, which indirectly influences the free 
movement of information towards the practitioner.192 In cases where there is concentration of 
shareholders, it is more likely that they manipulate the directors to have their way out at the 
cost of the interests of creditors not being properly represented.193 Therefore for the rights of 
creditors to be protected, it is in their interests to dismiss the directors from the management in 
financially troubled times.194 In a polarised situation where there is a diluted shareholding, 
there is a clear separation between owners and management; subsequently the wishes of 
creditors are more concrete and ascertainable.195 Even if there is pressure from shareholders, 
directors can easily opt out of the pressure and liaise with creditors in planning a reasonable 
rehabilitation regime.196 It can be concluded that the greater the concentrated shareholdings, the 
greater will be the tendency for the owners of the entity to manipulate.197 On the other hand, in 
a practitioner in control system, less influence will be expected by shareholders since the 
practitioner does not owe a specific compulsory duty to this particular group of investors.198 
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3.4 Different expertise and formation 
The UNCITRAL199 guide on the qualifications of practitioners specifies that the difficulty 
involved in dealing with various insolvency proceedings requires the practitioner to have a 
diversified legal, commercial and accounting knowledge combined with sufficient experience 
in such areas.200 The Act201 additionally dictates that the practitioner should have sufficient 
resources in terms of human and operational resources.202 Generally, a practitioner is also 
required to have some skills in restructuring policies, management, advertising and 
merchandise expansion.203 But it is vital that the insolvency expert has a minimum professional 
qualification to aid him to undertake the task of corporate reorganisation and make appropriate 
value judgements.204 In the furtherance of the outlook, as per section 138(2)(b), it is a requisite 
that the practitioner encourages sound principles and good practice of corporate turnaround.205 
 
Given the frequency with which the practitioner will be faced with different kind of 
corporate reorganisations, he might not be sufficiently equipped and at ease with various fields 
of expertise. Undoubtedly he will have the requisite skills and expertise in insolvency matters 
but he will not have an in-depth understanding of certain specific areas unrelated to his 
capabilities.206 Hence in such circumstances the insolvency professional will have recourse to 
the competency of other specialists on areas where he requires assistance.207 
 
The fees paid for the advice of a turnaround specialist on a particular matter can be 
expensive; and an additional cost can aggravate the liquidity position of a company which is 
already in a troubled situation.208 Given that the practitioner cannot delay in placing the 
company back on the normal rail, the competent professional who has been appointed to give 
advice on the specific matter may be pressurised to give a finalised recommendation in a short 
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span of time.209 The expert’s judgement can be compromised since he has less time to give due 
consideration to critical elements and might even ignore crucial factors.210 After reliance has 
been made on the expert opinion upon which proposals have been made, there is the possibility 
that creditors do not opt for those strategies but rather select those schemes which are most 
favourable to them and were based solely on the practitioner’s expertise.  
 
Regarding human resource or operational sphere, management is the most appropriate 
party to reach out to as it is better informed of the internal affairs with information obtained 
through board meetings.211 As such, those in charged with corporate governance, possess far 
greater relevant knowledge and data about the corporation than the practitioner.212 If 
management starts to anticipate an insolvent situation, they should duly continue to trade under 
these circumstances by keeping in mind the legal consequences.213 If they are not permitted to 
undertake the dealing, they should advise the practitioner to carry out the transactions by 
providing justifications. Nonetheless it might happen that the practitioner is reluctant to act 
accordingly, which can affect the rescue regime and give rise to conflict between him and 
management. 
 
It has been argued that directors should not be treated in a different way from other 
specialists like doctors, lawyers or bankruptcy specialists because their decision making 
process is almost alike.214 But there are intrinsic differences which make the role of the 
directors distinctive from other professionals.215 Firstly, other specialists have to undergo 
thorough broad academic preparation after which they need to undertake a period of practical 
training to ascribe the hierarchy to become an expert.216 In contrast, directors usually acquire 
tertiary education but once they have been appointed to form part of the top management, they 
should endeavor to comprehend and acquaint to the company’s philosophy, culture and 
activities by themselves.217 Other professionals act in an environment where variables do not 
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change much and a code of behaviour need to be followed to a certain degree where 
applicable.218 On the other hand, management functions in a dynamic and volatile atmosphere, 
where factors such as economic conditions are beyond its control.219 In case of fault on the part 
of the specialist, his service terminates and he can be sued under delict for failure to perform 
properly;220 whilst even if the directors underperform, they will remain the company’s 
consultant except if there is a serious reason for them to be removed from office or to resign.221 
Even if the directors continue to form part of management despite their directorial fault, it does 
not preclude them from being personally held liable for their breach of duties. 
 
With different background and expertise, it is very likely that the practitioner and the 
executive officers will have departing value judgements which can be anticipated to cause 
frictions and distortions affecting communication.222 Also information substantiated from 
experts having different background and judgement, can affect the planning and execution of 
strategies difficult with risks of misunderstandings, reservations and postponements arising 
during the period.223 It thus can be deduced that despite encouraging the input of information 
from diverse officers, there may be too much data will result in misinterpretation of evidence 
reinforcing diverging points of view instead of having a common ground on how the company 
should be reorganised.224 
 
3.5 Two different authorities 
Appointing a practitioner to manage the business gives the assurance of independence to 
third parties.225 By substituting management’s role, the insolvency expert is required to carry 
out the bulk of the functions of the directors.226 The rationale behind having an administrator to 
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oversee the company’s affairs and to supervise the managers’ functions to make sure that the 
practitioner acts as "whistleblowers" on unfit directors.227 
 
The more powers are being conferred to the practitioner during the rescue regime, the 
more measures should be put in place to curtail abuse of these prerogatives.228 With a wide 
scope of powers and full corporate control allocated to the practitioner, it is understood that he 
forms the sole formal authority. Alongside it can be appreciated that his dominance can be 
curtailed by management who has a subdued authority through arrangements for consultation 
and negotiation undertaken between the two parties. As a result, discussion encourages 
potential benefits in openness and accountability and it may improve fairness in the 
restructuration of the entity.  
 
However, the danger in a multiple authority decision making scenario is that differing 
opinions are exchanged which despite enhancing constructive discussion, can lead to a risk of 
potential deadlock.229 This can lead to compromise in the adoption of strategies where policies 
opted for, might benefit only a smaller number of stakeholders (such as creditors and 
shareholders) instead of equilibrating the interests of all affected parties (including the 
environment and the public in general). 
 
 It can be submitted that if the rescue procedures have not been initiated by the board of 
directors, they will not have a say in the appointment of the practitioner. Subsequently there is 
a possibility that the directors do not get along well with the practitioner or that the latter is not 
willing to heed what the management has to say. Moreover, it is statutorily provided by 
Chapter 6 of the Act that during the corporate rehabilitation process, the bankruptcy 
professional is entitled to dismiss any persons who formed part of the previous or current 
directorship from office.230 If the directors do not maintain a friendly relationship with the 
practitioner, they can be removed from the company. The managers will tend to compromise 
on what the practitioner says even if he is wrong, which can negatively affect the outcome of 
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the rescue proceedings. All these factors lead to more reservation on the part of management to 
team up freely with the insolvency practitioner. 
 
Where the practitioner exercises his discretionary prerogatives reservedly and allow 
management to do its’ job as it was before the rescue proceedings, he has more chances to have 
the cooperation of the directors which would help him to attain his objectives and targets.231 
However in the case of a defective management, such a collaboration would not be of much 
help; and only a very skilled and experienced practitioner would be able to revive the company 
from its’ financial difficulties.232 
 
3.6 Directors being blamed, no matter what 
A notion has been developed recently stating that to let the directors stay in charge of the 
management of the business could be compared as leaving a drunkard in charge of a pub233 
since they brought disgrace to the company.234 It has been commented that if a company is 
financially troubled, it is presumed that the directors failed to undertake their role as 
expected.235 Therefore they should no longer be entrusted the corporate control since they are 
the culprits for the insolvency.236 More modern perspectives of insolvency law not only 
advocate for the penalisation of management but also promote the allocation of time to the 
distressed company to prepare itself well before it faces the public humiliation and its’ 
repercussions.237 
 
South African law (based on the UK legal system) is reluctant to trust the skill and 
judgment of the existing managers. The regulatory framework does not welcome the thought of 
treating corporate difficulties as problems that need attention, but rather prefers to blame those 
charged with corporate governance for the business failure.238 This is why to ensure that 
management does not worsen the solvency position of the company, the provisions of the 
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section 137(2)(a) stipulate that although the directors of the company are not automatically 
removed from office during the proceedings, the scope of their duties is limited by the 
authorisation of the practitioner.239 
 
It is persuaded that when risk takers are wrong, they should be reprimanded and the 
management should be handed to a practitioner who has the requisite expertise.240 Conversely, 
there is the view that if there is a risk averse corporate culture, directors will be less motivated 
to perform well by taking risk for fear that they will be dismissed or for not receive bonuses if 
they resigned too late in the event the business experiences financial difficulties.241 But the 
general rule is that the more risks are taken, the greater are the returns. In this respect it might 
be said that the interests of shareholders are better protected if control stays in the hands of 
management. 
 
In financial difficulty, the directors are better acquainted with the company’s operations, 
they are thus more at ease to make better value judgement decision with regards to the 
rehabilitation.242 The top level executives are accustomed to take risks when faced with 
uncertainties and if the standard of care is set too high, their judgement can be influenced 
adversely.243 It should be highlighted that it is not proper to always blame them for corporate 
failure in case the entity starts to experience troubling situations due to external factors in spite 
of impeccable managerial capability.244 Generally the judiciary is not too keen to interfere with 
internal company matters and is reluctant to judge the actions of management severely.245 
 
It has been felt in the United States that instead of imposing harsh penalties, the provision 
of incentives to restructure businesses would encourage more companies to be set up which 
would result in job creation.246 Therefore it is not judicious to punish the management heavily, 
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except in cases of non-performance, gross negligence or trading recklessly, where they should 
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4. Chapter 3: Comparative Study 
Chapter 3 will cover the statutory provision of each respective jurisdiction, namely 
Australia, United Kingdom and United States with respect to managerial duties and powers of 
practitioners and directors during the time a company is placed under business rescue coupled 
with the insolvent trading provisions. These countries have been chosen for comparisons 
because of the following reasons: Australia because it has a very similar rescue provisions to 
South Africa; the South African corporate legal systems was significantly derived from English 
law in United Kingdom; and as for the United States, the Chapter 6 of the South African 




Despite being sports rivals, the legal systems of Australia and South Africa are both 
considerably founded on the English law247 and both countries have inherited a Commonwealth 
legacy.248 Having the same source of law, it would be wise to make an analysis of the 
Australian insolvency law. The relevant statutory provision is Part 5.3A of the Corporations 
Act 2001249 (hereafter ‘Corporations Act’) which caters for the administration of a company’s 
affairs with a view of executing a deed of company arrangement. The document usually 
dictates the future behaviour of the business which will aid to restore the company’s financial 
situation.250 Once a rescue plan has been approved by the creditors, the terms of the 
arrangement become binding on them, the entity and its owners.251 
 
The implication of such kind of arrangements is the loss of control from the management 
and the creditors have more importance.252 In this type of scheme, the interests of creditors are 
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better,253 particularly as the procedure instructs that an appointed committee of creditors will 
have the supervision of the administration until the deed is executed by the business.254 
 
4.1.1 Requirement to appoint a practitioner during business rescue 
Similarly to South Africa, the administration proceedings can be initiated by board of 
directors’ resolution255 or by a secured creditor.256 When the financially troubled company has 
recourse to the business rescue procedure termed as voluntary administration, an external 
administrator (which has similar role to the practitioner) is appointed.257 The appointment of 
the administrator is undertaken by the deed of company agreement.258 Upon employment, the 
administrator is required to take over the management of the business up to the time the deed 
becomes effective, after which he will have to follow the terms of his duties as stipulated into 
the agreement.259 The administrator is entitled to any performance or prerogatives that the 
company or any of its officers could exercise on a daily basis. 
 
4.1.1.1 Duties of practitioner 
When the business goes into voluntary administration, according to section 437A(1) of 
the Corporations Act, the control of the business is entrusted in the hands of the administrator 
who will manage the affairs with the aim of developing a deed of company arrangement.260 As 
provided by the section 435A of the Corporations Act, the objective behind this arrangement is 
that there is an increased possibility that the corporate foreseeable future will continue, which 
will have the potential effect that there will be a better return for both the creditors and 
members instead from what would have resulted from an immediate liquidation.  
 
Division 4 of Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act imposes a duty on the administrator to 
inquire into the company's affairs.261 He is required to inform the creditors at the meeting about 
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the outcomes of the various courses of action. It is further provided that he should report to 
regulatory authorities in case of infringement of the Corporations Act by the business.262 In the 
event, the administrator and the directors are too much at ease with each other, the regulatory 
authority Australian Securities and Investments Commission (hereafter ‘ASIC’) and the 
creditors have powers to apply to the Court to put an end to the administration or to protect 
their interests in accordance with sections 447A and B of the Corporations Act.263 The 
aggrieved parties can also make an application to the court to request for matters decided by the 
administrator to be reviewed according to the section 447E of the Corporations Act. 
 
4.1.1.2  Powers of Practitioners 
During the voluntary administration period, the administrator is given effective corporate 
control which includes the appointment, suspension or removal of directors and other officers. 
In fact it is stipulated by the section 442A of the Corporations Act provision that the 
administrator is entitled to remove officers forming part of the management and to appoint 
substitutes to fill in the vacant position.264 The administrator can exercise any powers or 
discharge any duty which was carried out by the officers before the rescue regime.265 Along 
with the execution of documents on behalf of the company, the administrator should undertake 
in good faith any action which is necessary.  
 
It may be noted that the privileges of the administrator are limited to the extent the 
creditors decide on the fate of the company and their willingness to use their discretion to 
restrict or extend the entitlements. It stands to reason that the range of powers will be 
determined through the creditors’ evaluation of the professionalism and ethical commitment of 
the practitioner.266 Any powers given through a deed of company arrangement will have to be 
respected according to the terms and conditions incorporated in the document.267 
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4.1.2 Role of directors 
Primarily the directors are required to assist the administrator but their roles are subject to 
changes depending on the terms set out in the deed of company arrangement. 
 
4.1.2.1 Duties of directors 
It is compulsory for directors to help the administrator by providing all relevant 
documentation and advice about the whereabouts of the records. Another duty imposed on 
them is that they should frequently meet and respond to the respective queries of the 
practitioner as far as these are reasonably feasible and in their capacity.268 
 
The directors are required to discharge their duty with care, skill and diligence as per the 
Section 232(4) of the Corporations Act. The standard of the duty that the officers should 
exercise is the demeanour of any reasonable individual having the same qualifications and is in 
a likewise corporate post as the directors, with respect to the circumstances of the entity.269 It 
should be noted that the explicit provisions in regard to insolvent trading is ‘an important 
subset of the duty of care’.270 
 
Additionally in Australia, the duties of directors are incorporated in the statutory business 
judgment rule as per section 180(1) of the stated law whereby some conditions have to be met 
so as the management can be immuned from liability to management for gross negligence.271 In 
order to have recourse to the rule, the directors should have had made ‘business judgements in 
good faith and for a proper purpose, have acted on an informed basis without material personal 
interest and have were rationally convinced that the decision taken is in the best interests of the 
corporation’.272 If any one of these elements has not been met, remedy under the principle 
cannot be sought.273 It is to be pointed out that the rule does not extend to the situations where 
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management has abandoned its responsibility and has failed to make use of sound judgement in 
the decision making process.274 
 
4.1.2.2 Powers of directors 
There is no law which gives shareholders or ordinary creditors the right to influence the 
appointment of an administrator. Further there is no provision that gives the court the power to 
issue make an order with respect to the appointment of the administrator. It makes sense that in 
the absence of provisions in that regard, it is the board which has the control of the 
appointment.275 
 
As per section 437C(2) of the Corporations Act, during administration period, directors 
are not dismissed but their powers can be frozen.276 Hence, they can only act when said and 
action has been authorised by the administrator.277 However, if they act without such authority, 
the act is void and they can be prosecuted for an offence under the section 437D(5) of the Act 
and may be liable for compensation.278 Nonetheless the powers of the directors may again 
become effective partly or wholly subject to a deed of company arrangement. It can be 
appreciated that the terms set out in the deed regarding the powers of the managers will depend 
largely on the creditors' opinion on the conduct of directors prior to the administration.279 
 
4.1.3 Insolvent trading 
Section 588G of Corporations Act provides for insolvent trading which prescribes a 
positive duty imposed on management to guarantee that no further debts are incurred when the 
company is or will be likely to be insolvent subsequent to the incurrence of the debt. It is 
necessary that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the insolvency of the company when 
additional financing liability is incurred.280 Generally the standard of the suspicion should be 
that any reasonable person in the same position in a business, experiencing the same company's 
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circumstances, should have the same doubt.281 It has been advocated that the objective of the 
insolvent trading provisions is to safeguard that directors stops ceases trading as soon as 




Contravening the Section 588G(2) of the Corporations Act on insolvent trading will result in 
various prospects of penalisation such as ‘civil penalty under Part 9.4B’.283 If the fraudulent 
determination, as one of the core elements for the criminalisation of the act has been proved as 
per Section 588G(3), criminal proceedings initiated in accordance with section 1317P.284 
Management can be prosecuted for criminal charges which can lead to either a fine of up to 
$220,000, an imprisonment for up to a term of 5 years, or both.285 Usually, the burden of proof 
is on the aggrieved party who is seeking remedy.286 In a civil case the standard of proof will on 
a balance of probabilities whilst in a criminal proceeding, the standard will be beyond 
reasonable doubt.287 
 
Another possibility of penalty being imposed is under Section 588M(1) which provides for 
compensation proceedings for amounts lost by creditors which can be initiated by ASIC, a 
liquidator or a creditor against a director personally, for which a compensation order can be 
made in addition to civil penalties.288 Compensation payments are potentially unlimited which 
could subsequently lead to the personal bankruptcy or disqualification of directors.289 It might 
also occur that their personal liability on guarantees is entailed or a notice can be sent, requiring 
them to be liable for unremitted tax deductions.290 The executive officers can further be subject 
to banning orders.291 
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4.1.3.2 Remedies 
The Corporations Act provides some statutory defences for directors. However, directors 
may find it hard to seek these safe harbours if they have not taken measures to be always be 
informed about the company’s financial position.292 One of the shields set out in section 
588H(2) of the Corporations Act is that the director needs to have reasonable justifications to 
prove that according to his judgement and assessment, he expected the business to be 
continuously solvent.293 Some other safeguards according to the sections 588H(4) and 588H(5) 
are respectively that the director did not participate in the management of the company at the 
time the debt was incurred for a good reason or that the officer took necessary measures to 
avoid that the business incurring the financing liability.294 The court also has the authority to 
excuse the director from liability if he has acted honestly and have met the criteria provided by 
the section 1317 and 1318.295 
 
As stated earlier, directors are entitled to also seek redress under the business judgment 
rule which provides that directors must have had exercised their powers and carrying out their 
duties with the good faith, care and diligence of a reasonable person. Thus they need not have 
any intention of acquiring any material personal interest and should instead focus their 
judgment in the best interests of the corporation.296 It could be concluded that the directors will 
not be able to have recourse to the business judgment rule if they failed to take measures in 
averting insolvent trading as provided by the Section 180(2) of the Corporations Act.297 
 
4.2 United Kingdom 
The South African law is derived from the English law, as such it is important to analyse 
this comparable legal mechanism to attempt to probe into appropriate solutions. Respectively 
we will rely primarily on Enterprise Act 2002 (hereafter ‘Enterprise Act’) and Insolvency Act 
1986 (hereafter ‘Insolvency Act’). The Insolvency Act was based on the recommendation of 
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the Cork Committee which advanced that an efficient bankruptcy law should preserve the 
viability of companies to make a productive contribution to the economy of the society.298 
Subsequently, the same approach has been adopted by the judiciary; and the Court observed 
that the law has ‘rescue-friendly’ provisions.299 British bankruptcy law is founded on the 
presumption that if the company becomes financially distressed, it is because of a gross 
mismanagement and therefore the directors should be de-possessed with executive 
responsibilities.300 Unlike the Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986 which empowers 
theadministrator with wide powers, the South African Companies Act refrains from adopting 
such approach.301 
 
4.2.1 Requirement to appoint a practitioner during business rescue 
The Enterprise Act was enacted as an attempt to inculcate a rescue culture by shifting 
control from the hands of the management into that of an independent insolvency professional 
referred as the administrator, which is the equivalent of the South African practitioner.302 The 
administrator needs to be qualified to act as a bankruptcy specialist.303 
 
4.2.1.1 Duties of practitioner 
The Enterprise Act requires for an administration order to be obtained in accordance with 
the section 8(3) paragraph 3 of the new Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act for the rescue 
proceedings to commence. The Enterprise Act states that the bankruptcy specialist shall firstly 
ensure the foreseeability of life of the troubled entity by maximising the value of the 
corporation.304 In the second position of the objective hierarchy, the administrator must 
perform his functions with the objective to achieve a better result for the creditors instead of the 
business being winding up.305 If the two of the aforementioned objectives cannot be met, the 
practitioner should ‘realise collateral for the benefit of secured and preferential creditors’.306 To 
meet the aims mentioned, an administrator is required to carry out his functions as soon as he is 
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appointed.307 However it should be noted that the Enterprise Act restricts the duration of the 
administration to a maximum 12 months;308 but an extension can be granted by the Court or by 
the creditors.309 
 
Generally the practitioner will be appointed ‘by a secured creditor having security over 
the whole of the assets of the company’.310Although the creditors have significant influence 
over the employment of an administrator, the latter should not only focus on the benefits of the 
creditors.311 The administrator has also a duty towards the company and its shareholders as he 
is required to preserve the business of the entity.312 Any aggrieved party can apply to court in 
the event the practitioner did not consider or harmed his interests.313 Consequently as defence, 
the administrator should justify how the rescue was better achieved by forgoing the interests of 
that particular stakeholder. Since it a subjective test to be applied, it is very likely there will be 
limited room for judicial review.314 
 
Whilst being entrusted with the management of the business, the administrator is required 
to carry out an investigation into the affairs of the entity and formulate a proposal to restore the 
financial position of the business.315 The plans advanced by the administrator need the approval 
of a simple majority of the creditors for the strategies proposed to be executed.316 By putting 
forward various proposals, the administrator is compelled to explain his choice and justify why 
a specific cause of action is more suitable rather than the others.317 
 
4.2.1.2 Powers of Practitioners 
In United Kingdom, the practitioner acts as the company's agent318 who is entitled to 
undertake any action or decision that is necessary for the normal operation of the business.319 
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The prerogatives include the right to manage and dispose of assets.320 The administrator has the 
power to appoint or remove directors under the Insolvency Act.321 In fact the wide entitlements 
of the practitioner mean that the expert should be accountable about his actions if he does not 
promote the benefits of creditors.322 If he does not perform his duties well, his powers may be 
curtailed or snatched from him. The creditors have the capacity to have the administrator 
removed from office if he does not prioritise their wishes. The employment of the administrator 
can also cease subsequent to his own application to Court requesting for his discharge.323 
 
4.2.2 Role of the directors 
The directors still form part of management but have a secondary role comprising of 
assisting the adinistrator as and when required. They should apply the standard of care, 
diligence and skills when performing their duties. 
 
4.2.2.1 Duties of directors 
Directors should carry out their duties as prescribed by the sections 171 to 177 of the 
UK’s Companies Act 2006 with respect to the duty of reasonable care and skill, obligation not 
to accept any benefits from third party, ensuring the success of the business, to make rational 
decisions, to prevent any risk of conflict of interest and if a director has any interest, he is 
required to make related disclosures.324 A specific duty imposed on the directors particularly 
during the bankruptcy situation is that from the time the corporation becomes insolvent, the 
management is required to prioritise the benefits and wishes of the creditors since they are the 
ones who are most affected by the loss in value of the corporation.325 In case the directors 
became aware that the financial situation is worsening, they should cease trading. If they 
continue to transact, they may be liable for the offence of wrongful trading or fraudulent 
dealing. 
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The managers should also abide by the duties enumerated above as well endeavouring to 
promote the interest of the corporation, to utilize the assets of the entity only for the business’ 
transactions, to respect and apply the principles laid in the constitution of the company and to 
prevent to make secret profit.326 The practitioner has a significant power to influence the 
performance of management where he is entitled to bring a claim for summary judgment on the 
behalf of the business to assert any infringement of duty owed by a director as per the section 
212 of the Insolvency Act.   
 
4.2.2.2 Powers of directors 
Often when directors are considering to engage a practitioner, they will take into account 
if the administrator would be most probably accept their continued management of the 
business.327 As there is no express restriction that a practitioner cannot retain the assistance of 
the directors, the latter can still form part of the decision making process.328 Additionally, the 
powers of management are subject to the approval of the practitioner to the extent these 
privileges do not interfere with the functions of the administrator.329 Subsequently, the 
administrator may delegate some of his functions in the directors' hands but he cannot assign all 
of them so as to escape responsibilities. 
 
4.2.3 Insolvent trading 
In United Kingdom, the law caters for two offences which constitute insolvent trading. 
These legal violations are namely fraudulent trading and wrongful trading. It is worth noting 
that wrongful trading is more closely related to insolvent trading. By contrast to wrongful 
trading, fraudulent trading is a lesser offence. 
 
Fraudulent trading is a criminal offence where the directors continue to carry out 
operations with the aim to defraud the creditors of the entity. It is defined as necessitating real 
deceitfulness with relation to the common practice of equitable trading by section 213 of the 
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Insolvency Act.330 Thus the offence requires that there is a lesser intention of fraud by the 
directors although they have been acting in bad faith.331 The court can order the directors to 
contribute the assets if the judicial institution determines that the officers were party to a 
transaction whereby the aim was to defraud creditors.332  
 
The concept of wrongful trading was taken from the recommendation of the Cork 
Committee. The foundation of the principle is that any person who continues to trade despite 
knowing that the company is insolvent or is unable to meet its current expenses should be held 
liable.333 Section 214 of the Insolvency Act is considered to be a powerful instrument in 
changing the conduct of management in case there is a high risk that the business might fall 
into insolvency.334 The provision stipulates that wrongful trading is a situation whereby 
management continues to undertake business although it was aware that the entity might go 
into liquidation. Given that it is a civil offence, section 214 of the Insolvency Act requires that 
the mental intent of the director to undertake fraud should only be proved on a balance of 
probabilities.335 
 
Liability only takes place upon insolvent liquidation and does not relate to the entire life 
of the business.336 In order to refute accusations of wrongful trading, directors should prove 
that they took all reasonable and necessary measure to curtail any loss or detrimental 
consequences once they took cognisance there is no possibility that the business can escape 
winding up.337 In order to be exempted from liability, a director should respect the standard and 
duties required to be exercised by any reasonable director having the same experience.   
 
4.2.3.1 Penalties 
The personal liability of directors can be pursued under the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act with respect to consistent breaches of the corporate law, corporate fraud, 
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previous similar offences, unfitness and participation in wrongful or fraudulent trading.338 
Moreover, under the section 993 of United Kingdom’s Companies Act 2006, an offender of 
fraudulent trading is liable to a fine of up to £10,000 whilst there is a separate penalty for 
wrongful trading which is primarily of compensatory nature rather than penal.339 
 
4.2.3.2 Remedies 
There is no specific statutory provision for the business judgment rule in this jurisdiction 
but the principle has been adopted informally. The business judgment rule is founded on the 
assumption that the director took decision in good faith and by taking all relevant factors in 
consideration before making use of his judgement.340 The courts have customarily been 
reluctant to adjudicate on directors' business decisions where fraud or bad faith was not a 
factor.341 The rule safeguards the decision of management which was taken rationally and in 
the best interest of the entity, instead of the replacing strategies through the verdict of the 
court.342 
 
There is a defence set out at section 214(3) of the Insolvency Act which can exonerate the 
liability of directors if they are able to satisfy the Court that they took all appropriate measures 
to ensure that the potential loss to the creditors have been curtailed upon being informed that 
there is no reasonable prospect of the business to prevent liquidation.343 
 
4.3 United States of America 
This thesis adds the United States of America as a comparison because when South 
Africa was considering changing the business rescue procedures, the Department of Trade and 
Industry344 issued a documentary guideline stating that the reform would be based largely on 
the Chapter 11 of the American Bankruptcy Code 1978 (hereafter ‘the Code’).345 Although the 
South African insolvency system has a creditor friendly approach, the Act is influenced by the 
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Chapter 11 which focuses on a debtor friendly rescue proceedings.346 The American approach 
‘encourages an early and timely resort’ to corporate restructuration ‘instead of postponing it 
until’ the entity starts to experience severe financial difficulties.347 
 
In the United States, there is a culture which is ‘much more tolerant to lack of 
liquidity’.348 It was experienced in the country that less severe penalties would assist financially 
failed companies to recover, which will in turn incentivise more incorporation of companies 
leading to job creation.349 The reorganisation process described in Chapter 11, was initially 
designed to target small companies which has cash difficulties and required the observation of 
the court in order to revive the financial position.350 Therefore the Chapter has the main 
objective of aiding the rescheduling the business’ affairs until it financially recovers.351 There 
is the presumption that the troubled business worth more through restructuring rather than by 
liquidating the entity.352 Nonetheless, it is up to management to decide whether to initiate the 
reorganisation process or not and the regulation provides that for an effective corporate 
rehabilitation, it is vital for the Court to intervene.353 Normally, the rescue proceedings start 
with a voluntary filing of a petition by the distressed corporation.354 
 
4.3.1 Requirement to appoint a practitioner 
In the United States, there is no requirement to appoint a practitioner but some of the 
managerial decisions making processes can be influenced by the creditors’ committee whilst in 
other cases, the approval of the bankruptcy court might be required. Further, in exceptional 
cases, section 1104 of the Code provides that a trustee will be appointed by the United States 
Trustee or by the Court upon application by an affected party.355 The trustee will be employed 
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to manage the business of the company356 but the oversight of the rescue process is undertaken 
by the Court.357 
 
Where there has been fraudulent behaviour, failure to perform, significant 
mismanagement or suspicion of same and it is consequently in the interests of all important 
stakeholders to appoint a trustee,358 the officer of the State will be employed to substitute the 
directors of the entity after the commencement of a reorganisation but preceding the conclusion 
of a plan.359 The trustee should be adequately qualified, independent from the company and 
must not have any affinity with any person related to the company’s management or to a direct 
stakeholder.360 In practice, ‘most trustees are traditionally appointed from the ranks of 
attorneys’.361 
 
4.3.1.1 Duties of practitioner 
In the American system, there is no practitioner but the system makes provision for 
trustees who are appointed by a court order, only in the event that management is dishonest and 
such an order would be in the interests of creditors.362 The trustee will carry out any necessary 
performance required so that the liquidity position of the distressed entity is stabilised. His duty 
would include monitoring the progress of the proceedings and ‘the compliance of reporting 
requirements’.363 The trustee can appoint members of official committees such as the 
committee of unsecured creditors.364 The trustee is entitled to hire experts such as lawyers, 
accountants amongst others. If the committee has been employed, it will be designated to 
monitor the operations of the business, consult on significant business strategies.365 
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If a trustee has not been employed, the creditors committee will provide their views on 
the manner the entity should be restructured. The strategies set out in a reorganisation plan 
necessitate the approval of the majority of creditors and two-thirds in value of holdings of each 
category of creditors.366 Indirectly, it is the creditors' committee which has a strong influence 
on the way the company's restructuring should be undertaken since their interests should be 
protected.367 The best interests test protects dissenting creditors by supporting that each one of 
them who objects should obtain a minimum return which is equivalent to the amount the party 
would have received if the entity would wind up.368 
 
4.3.1.2 Powers of practitioner 
A creditors’ committee is only allowed to advise the distressed company but the control 
stays in the hands of the management as suggested by the subsection 1103(c) of the Code. 
Under subsection 1103(c)(2) of the Code, the committee has the privilege of investigating into 
the company’s affair which will ultimately help them in making an informed decision about the 
feasibility of a reorganisation plan.369 Creditors are entitled to propose restructuring plans only 
after a few months after the troubled company, through its’ management has made such 
plans.370 
 
If the committee appreciates management is unable to restructure the company properly, 
they may seek that a trustee be appointed pursuant to Code subsection 1103(c)(4) and Section 
1104. The appointed supervisor or trustee can be considered to be a ‘second-class 
administrator’ with restricted prerogatives because they are entitled with only half of the salary 
allocated to administrators normally.371 
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4.3.2 Role of directors 
The directors still carry out the same duties and functions as before the company goes 
into the zone of insolvency since the management of the company is still placed in their hands. 
Under the insolvency legislation laws, dealings that fall outside of the scope of the company's 
ordinary course of business require the bankruptcy court approval beforehand, which implicitly 
equates to an additional layer of protection for the director.372 
 
4.3.2.1 Duties of directors 
The Chapter 11 provides that pre-insolvency managers of the company should stay in 
control subject to supervision by the Court,373 a scenario, referred to as debtor-in-possession 
(hereafter ‘DIP’). This is a situation where the debtor company remains in control of its own 
business through its’ directors. While continuing to run its business, the company, assisted by 
its advisors, works to develop a plan of restructuring from negotiations among the 
stakeholders.374 Management has the exclusive right to make proposals with regards to the plan 
for a period of 120 days, after which the creditors may do so.375 The court needs to approve the 
rescue plan376 which emphasise the importance for the distressed business to meet the 
commitments listed in the plan.377 During the period of DIP, the managers are entitled to the 
same powers as an appointed trustee would have, if he was employed.378 
 
In general, the directors manage the corporation for the benefit of shareholders but when 
the business is insolvent, the absolute priority rule of Chapter 11 of the Code instructs that the 
focus should instead be diverted towards the safeguard of the interests of the creditors since the 
latter will bear the risk of loss in the value of the entity.379 This approach has long been adopted 
by the Court in the adjudication of cases.380 But there has been some judicial statements 
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arguing that during the insolvency period, the directors have a duty to stakeholders who sustain 
the business and they should take decisions in an informed good faith manner so as to optimise 
the entity’s capacity to generate wealth in the long run.381 Therefore the DIP places a duty on 
the managers to balance the interests of all relevant parties and resolve the conflicting tensions 
that arise between them.382 
 
The directors should continue to apply the standard of the duty of reasonable diligence 
and care. As for the duty of care, it has been partly inspired by the law of delict.383 It is 
considered that the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by the company should be treated as a 
default rule.384 If the directors have applied the standard as required, they may seek protection 
under the judgement rule.385 However it is vital that the executive officers cognise that all 
material information are readily be available to them before making a business decision.  
 
The business judgement rule has been catered for by common law386 by way of case laws 
as there is no specific statute providing for the rule.387 Only the principles of the American Law 
Institute's Corporate Governance project stipulate for the doctrine.388 The judgement rule 
requires the officers to make calculated decisions relating to the business in good faith by being 
informed that it is correct to undertake such decisions in these particular circumstances. The 
directors should rationally believe that such decision will be in the best interest of the entity.389 
Since the rule protects officers, even the appointed trustee can seek refuge under the rule.390 
However if it has been proved that the officers did not take any precautionary measures, they 
will not be shielded from liability. Unlike the Australian and English approach, in the United 
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States, the criterion of taking a decision in good faith is implied and is not specifically 
expressed as a separate pre-condition.391 
 
4.3.2.2 Powers of Directors 
One of the proposals put forward during the promulgation of the Code was that the 
company should still have corporate control so as to encourage management to have recourse 
to remedies provided by the Chapter 11; otherwise they will delay to solve the insolvency 
situation by relying to the appropriate statutory measures when there will be no longer 
prospects for reorganisation and it would be too late for a potentially effective rehabilitation.392 
In line with this theory, provisions regarding wrongful trading and directors’ disqualification 
are foreign to the American law.393 
 
As mentioned above, many of the managerial decisions are subject to the disclosure and 
consent of the bankruptcy court. It should also be highlighted that even though the company, 
through its directors, will carry business usually, it will require the permission of court in order 
to proceed with the disposal of substantial assets and other significant transactions.394 
 
4.3.3 Insolvent trading 
Insolvent trading is not specifically prescribed in any American legislation but there was 
an equivalent liability theory in the past which was developed and termed as deepening 
insolvency; which made it wrongful to allow a business which should have stopped trading, to 
continue to incur and amass more debts.395 The theory has now been discarded but has been 




The concept of damages for deepening insolvency is that there are times when a director's 
conduct, either fraudulently or negligently, reduces the life the corporation, thereby increasing 
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the corporation's debt and exposure to creditors. Managers owing a fiduciary obligation may be 
held personally liable for damages suffered by creditors.  
 
4.3.3.2 Remedies 
Under the business judgment rule, there is a belief that in the decision making process, 
the management must take into account all the relevant factors to be considered and ensure that 
the interests of the company is primed amidst other stakeholders. When directors have taken 
decisions thoughtfully, the courts will be more likely to adjudicate that their decisions are valid. 
In this way, the rule subtly allows the directors to have discretionary powers without being 
questioned about the intelligence of their decision in retrospection.397 
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5. Chapter 4: Analysis and Recommendations 
This Chapter will be the subject of recommendations to be proposed based on the critical 
analysis of the provisions analysed earlier in the previous chapter. 
 
5.1 Australia 
In Australia, corporate reorganisation is being done through a deed of arrangement. The 
main aim of such scheme is to promote the interests of both shareholders and creditors. Also, 
the regime caters for the remedial solutions in case the administrator and the directors become 
too close. These points will be considered below, together with the analysis of the business 
judgement rule not covering the insolvent trading decisions. 
 
5.1.1 Deed of company’s arrangement 
By undertaking a deed of arrangement to pursue a rescheduling of debts, the expected 
results of the rescue proceedings are specifically elaborated upon, by enumerating the list of 
priorities and describing the manner in which the corporate salvation will be carried out. This 
mechanism is a very flexible one,398 catering for each case scenario and it will be up to the 
creditors to decide what options would be more convenient for effective rehabilitation 
proceeding. The notarial agreement can stipulate strategies which will align with the hierarchal 
objective of preserving the value of the business by ensuring its’ going concern. The assenting 
administrator who is a party to the deed, should respect the targets which are anticipated to be 
achieved; otherwise in case of failure to follow the instructions or non-performance, he will be 
liable to contractual penalties.  
 
The contracting parties towards whom the terms and conditions of the scheme will be 
binding, constitute of most of the important actors on whom the corporate rehabilitation might 
impact consequenttly, namely the entity which will be represented by the directors, the 
shareholders of the company, the administrator and the creditors. Since the significant 
stakeholders have the opportunity to represent their rights sufficiently in the arrangement, there 
is less likely to be temptation stemming from each of them to influence the views of the 
administrator. In this way, the management will not doubt the intentions of the administrator 
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about focusing on only certain groups of stakeholders and be willing to provide help to the 
administrator. Also, the executive officers will be contractually required to assist the 
administrator as per the terms of the deed, thus eradicating the threat of any resistance on the 
part of the managers. But on the other hand, it can be advanced that the administrator will be 
requiring the assistance of management and eventually he may have the tendency to be 
influenced by the directors. To limit the breeding of an over-familiar affinity between the two 
parties, it is advisable to put the creditors as the responsible party handling the ultimate 
supervision the business rescue process.  
 
The execution deed of the company’s arrangement encourages the practitioner to 
prioritise the interests of the creditors and to put in second place benefits of the other binding 
parties to the agreement. Thus, even if the company and its shareholders being unhappy about 
this ranking of rights, they cannot disrupt the reorganisation process because they were 
consenting to the agreement specifying the prioritisation. Furthermore, as the creditors will be 
supervising the execution meanwhile the deed is to be effective, their wishes are anticipated to 
be respected. However it can be refuted that the benefits of the creditors do not necessarily 
equate to the going concern of the company, thus misdirecting the administrator from its prime 
objective of saving the business.  
 
The powers conferred to the administrator during the administration in Australia are 
subject to the terms integrated in the deed of company arrangement. The conditions of the 
agreement, including the terms relating to the appointment and role of the administrator, are 
therefore decided by the creditors of the company. It can be submitted that South African 
Companies Act should cater for the creditors to have the authority to determine the powers of 
the practitioner. As such there will be a better possibility for the creditors to influence the 
extent to which the rights of the practitioner can be safeguarded; and it will reduce any 
probable abuse of powers by the insolvency professional. Also, if the practitioner is inclined to 
promote any other interests than that of the company, the creditors are entitled to take 
appropriate measures to sanction the administrator. With creditors acting as a watchdog, the 
directors will be less pressurised to be dismissed from office by the practitioner, and will thus 
be able to do their job more efficiently without the need to compromise on their duties. In light 
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the creditors, by particularly entrusting them with the capacity to supervise the rehabilitation 
process, can be reiterated. 
 
In the same fashion to the prerogatives of the administrator, the powers of the directors 
are ascertained by the same company’s deed. The powers entrusted to the management will be 
largely based on the creditors’ assessment of the directors’ conduct before the company was 
placed under rescue regime.399 Therefore if the directors have been consistently been doing 
their job faultlessly, there are high chances that they would not be heavily penalised for 
insolvent trading, without their powers being expropriated away from them. In the event, some 
privileges of the managers are taken away from them, the creditors can revive the entitlements 
of the management partly or wholly as per their discernment. The directors may even be 
permitted to have a significant say in the formulation of strategic policies and participation in 
the decision making process. Since the managers are bound by the King Code principles and 
the provisions of the Companies Act, they will endeavour to promote the interests of creditors 
along with other stakeholders, and simultaneously direct the practitioner to follow the same 
approach.  
 
5.1.2 Better returns for both shareholders and creditors 
As provided by the section 435A of the Corporations Act, the aim of the administration 
regime is that if the continuity of the life of the entity cannot be ensured, a better return should 
be generated for both the creditors and members instead of what would have resulted from a 
spontaneous winding up. On the other side, the South African provision is more or less the 
same with the exception that the prioritisation of benefits should either be for the creditors or 
alternatively for the shareholders. It can be suggested that the South African legislature should 
amend the Companies Act to align with the Australian law, by reflecting that the interests of 
both the members and the creditors of the corporation should be safeguarded and maximized; 
resulting in the likelihood of friction emanating from the management towards the practitioner 
to be decreased. This is so because the directors will be reassured that the administrator is 
doing the job of the management by promoting the company’s interests through the protection 
of the rights of the entity’s owners. Also, there will be less pressure from the shareholders to 
remove the directors since they might perceive that the management has lobbied for their 
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wishes to be met and the officers have abided to their fiduciary duty owed towards them and 
the distressed entity. 
 
5.1.3 Comfortable relationship between administrator and management 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, in Australia, the creditors or the courts have the 
right to cease the administration of the administrator in the scenario where the specialist 
becomes too comfortable with the management. In order to ensure that practitioners do not 
influence the opinion of directors, or the other way round, which might have an impact on 
various stakeholders, especially the shareholders, the South African regulation have adopted a 
similar approach.400 In order to ensure that the interests of the company are protected by 
safeguarding the rights of its’ members, as an affected party the shareholders can apply in 
terms of the Act to dismiss the managers in the case where there has been a loss of objectivity 
and independence on the part of these officers. Otherwise, directors might be induced by the 
bankruptcy practitioner to protect the rights of creditors and thus fail to apply the duty of 
fiduciary which they owe to the owners of the troubled entity. 
 
5.1.4 Insolvent Trading and the Business Judgement Rule 
As stated in the preceding chapter, the business judgement rule in Australia does not 
apply to insolvent trading.401 Such an approach does not uphold management’s use of 
discretion and judgement to continue trading; by supporting that it might be risky that as a 
result of leniency in the application of the rule, the liquidity situation of the business can be 
affected significantly. From a different perspective, Goode commented that managers ‘can be 
faulted just as much for a premature cessation of trading as for continuing to trade while 
insolvent’.402 The business judgement rule being not inclusive of the insolvent trading decisions 
will force directors to stop trading, which might bring more losses to creditors than if the 
officers continued to transact despite the liquidity difficulty of the entity.403 It can further be 
advocated that taking risks means more returns for the shareholders. Inciting the management 
not to take the risk of trading, where it is believed that to continue the corporate transactions 
would results in potential gains for the company, can equate to the returns of the shareholders 
                                                 
400 Section 139(1)(e) of the Companies Act stipulating that upon a court application by an affected party, the 
administrator can be removed on the ground of lack of independence. 
401 Farrar op cit (n141) 746. 
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through capital gains and dividend distribution being dwindled. Letting an opportunity of the 
distressed company to outdo financially would means that there is the danger for the creditors 
in retrieving their investment in the business. So in this line of thought, not maximizing the 
benefits of creditors and shareholders go against the basics of a reorganisation regime. 
 
Australia has adopted its’ principles of business judgement rule mainly from the United 
States.404 Inopportunely, no extensive investigation has been probed into the American law and 
how to adapt the legal transplant conveniently.405 Aftermath, the fruits of the outcome was not 
as good as hoped.406 But the application of the rule in both jurisdictions is restricted to 
decisions strictly made only with respect to the business of the entity. However it should be 
appreciated that the South African judgement rule is extended to any decisions made the 
directors, including business decisions and those policies which are not related to the business 
of the entity.407 It can be deduced that the unrestrained application of the rule will enable 
directors to take decisions, without the compulsory approval of the practitioner. In this way, the 
directors not feeling intimidated by the consent and authority of the administrator, will be ready 
to assist the latter. As a counter argument, it can be defended that even though the wider the 
scope providing protection to directors for any of their actions, it can be argued that the officers 
can make wrong use of the rule and they can backed their decisions by documentary evidences 
which can be subject to manipulation. 
 
5.2 United Kingdom 
The hierarchal duties of the administrator during business rescue phase in the United 
Kingdom are similar to South African statutory provisions, except that the latter do not make 
express stipulation of the realisation of collateral for specific classes of creditors. The 
administration period in this particular jurisdiction is limited unlike the other countries which 
were covered in this project. The British approach does not trust the capabilities of the directors 
post insolvency and provides for the disqualification of these officers in this illiquidity 
circumstance. During the administration period, the administrator is given wide powers so that 
he can restore the financial position of the distressed entity to make it profitable. The extensive 
                                                 
404 Farrar op cit (n141) 761. 
405 Ibid. 
406 Ibid. 
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prerogatives given will render the administrator proportionately accountable; which is why the 
decisions taken by him can be reviewed judicially. These peculiar characteristics will be 
analysed below. 
 
5.2.1 Focus on creditors 
The same aims of business rescue are set out in the South African legal framework with 
the exception of the third function of the administrator to realise the collateral for the returns of 
preferential and secured creditors. Since our research question does not cover the protection of 
different class of creditors per se, we will ignore that part. But it should be noted that the duty 
imposed on directors during the insolvency period is to prioritise the interests of the creditors, 
irrespective of their categories. With both the administrator and management having the same 
objective of promoting and maximising the returns of creditors, there is less likely to be 
reluctance on the part of managers to assist, curtailing the danger of probable conflicts which 
can arise between both parties. 
 
Granted that the creditors are the most affected by the company being insolvent but it 
should be noted that the shareholders are also aggrieved by the worse off from the financial 
situation. The owners of the company generally experience a decrease in their capital gain since 
the value of the entity has decreased considerable due to the reputational loss. According to the 
Enterprise Act, there is no mention about the administrator protecting the rights of the members 
of the entity. Directors who are appointed by the shareholders, owe a fiduciary duty to the 
members even if the commitment is diminished with the financially distressed situation. Thus 
the administrator not being statutorily required to safeguard the interests of the shareholders, 
can act against the directorial obligation which can lead the management to be resistant to help 
the administrator. 
 
5.2.2 Short duration of administration 
The time limit of the administration under the Enterprise Act is 12 months. The 
advantage of such a time constraint implies that the troubled company needs to be rescued 
without undue delay. The rationale behind such a time frame is the sooner the corporate 
rehabilitation takes place, the better the company will recover and start to trade normally back 
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from the public disgrace and improve the operational situation. To execute reorganisation 
strategies can be done very fast but to see the results of it, can take more than one year. 
Therefore putting such a tight deadline to assess the outcome of the rescue process can be 
unrealistic. But at the same time, not putting a time limit can allure the administrator to delay 
his response to the restructuration process which can affect the success of the regime. Thus it 
can be proposed that the South African law can provide a similar mechanism of putting a 
reasonable time frame within which the rescue proceedings should be effective and come to 
term. 
 
5.2.3 Wide powers and Judicial Review of decisions of the administrator 
Given that the administrator is empowered to dismiss the directors at any time during his 
administration, there is a possibility that there will be a tensed relationship between them. Also, 
as the administrator has the right to bring a claim for summary judgement against the 
management for breach of duties, there will be tendency from the directors to be providing the 
administrator with only the basic assistance. They will not try to go out of their way to give an 
insight to the administrator about the inherent environment and the mechanism of the business, 
which can potentially affect the restructuring process negatively. Moreover, they might window 
dress information in such a way to ensure that the administrator does not discover their breach 
of duty. On the other side, the administrator having such wide powers, implicates he can make 
wide use of his discretion.408 However in the presence of monitoring institutions, he may 
abandon his faculty of making value judgement because he might be reported to have has an 
adverse behaviour.409 He might perceive this privilege as an additional duty which will be 
strictly assessed instead of the discretionary faculty being a power in the proper sense.410 
 
In the British jurisdiction, the administrator has to justify why he prefers to adopt a 
specific strategy rather than the others. This ensures that the benefits of most stakeholders are 
taken into account; and if not, explanation should be provided. Such a duty imposed on the 
insolvency expert decreases the degree to which he might focus on other personal motivations 
or for opting for a particular and biased cause of action. In spite of the clarifications given, if 
the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the justification of the strategy adopted, it can consider 
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to apply to court to have the decision of the practitioner being reviewed. However the issue 
which may be encountered by the Court in determining the correctness of the decision taken is 
that strategies are taken with respect to the circumstances of the entity. Since the Court is not 
acquainted to the business’ culture and operations, it might be difficult to make an accurate and 
appropriate determination. Therefore, it can be suggested that the South African law should 
include the accessibility of any aggrieved party, integrating not only shareholders and creditors 
but also employees, the public and the supporters of environment to seek the review of the 
decision of the practitioner before the Court, if they have been affected by the policy adopted. 
 
5.2.4 Disqualification of directors 
It was experienced that the concept of wrongful trading will act as ‘a potential catalyst’ to 
change the managerial comportment in the long run.411 The risk of losing the shield of limited 
liability if the managers undertake transactions in an insolvent situation, will entice these 
officers to improve their directorial behavior.412 Any enhancements in the standard of conduct 
will directly impact the reoganisation proceedings, with more capable directors to keep updated 
with the progress of the proceedings and to be informed about new information which 
altogether will give the officers the insight to rectify the corporate issues.413 
 
It can be defended that the imposition of the directors’ disqualification might discourage 
the management to use its’ discretion to take decisions. Moreover, the managerial debarment 
signifies that the freedom given to the executive officers in taking a decision under the business 
judgement rule is being undermined.414 Under the threat that court will scrutinise their 
decisions and try to second-guess the reasoning for opting for a particular decision, directors 
will be reluctant to take risks on behalf of the entity so as to avoid being disqualified.415 By 
anticipating the possibility of prosecution, the directors may be tempted to keep records of the 
board minutes so that they can produce the documentary evidences to prove that the strategies 
chosen are justified.416 Thus it can be said that such an approach does not induce directors to 
freely communicate or advice the administrator in case the latter requires assistance. 
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5.3 United States of America 
In America, the directors remain in control of the business operations and decision 
making process during the insolvency period. The managers formulate strategic policies to be 
adopted in the rescue period so as to bring the troubled company back in the profitable phase. 
However, after a certain time, the creditors’ committees can propose schemes to be 
implemented as part of the rescue plan. If the directors believe that they will not be able to 
restitute the corporate health of the distressed entity, they can have recourse to the assistance of 
a supervisor which is usually a trustee. Irrespective of the liquidity status or the appointment of 
the trustee, the managers are tacitly required to exercise their duty in good faith. In certain 
circumstances, the doings of the executive officers will be subject to the approval or under the 
oversight of the Court. The mentioned points will be studied below. 
 
5.3.1 Management staying in control but subject to the supervision 
The advantage of the approach adopted in the United States is that the management stays 
in control even if the company encounters cashflow complications. The attitude integrates 
promptness of action which is essential for an effective financial recovery, whereby even if the 
company has not fallen into the insolvency zone, remedial measures are carried out to improve 
the situation. Further, the manoeuvre places reliance on the capability of directors capable to 
restore the financial position of the entity who might occasionally require help. This is why the 
supervision of the judiciary is required, so as to ensure that major transactions are not 
undertaken without its’ approval. As a consequence, directors being left in control with the 
same executive responsibility together with the supervision of the Court, will result in an 
effective corporate restructuration. However it has been argued that the extent of the court’s 
involvement with respect to the reorganisation of debts is not clear during the period the entity 
continues to trade.417 Even if the Court interferes during the restructuration phase, it will 
attempt to make orders which are contradictory to the functions and commitments of the 
management. In pursuance of the conflict perspective, it can be inferred that since no rescue 
practitioner will be appointed, there will no clashes arising with respect to the duties of the 
directors.  
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Subsequent to serious cases of gross mismanagement, the directors will no longer have 
the entire corporate control and accordingly the officer of the government, the trustee will be 
appointed. Practically the trustee will be attorneys which means they are very well accustomed 
to the bankruptcy law and will adopt remedial measures which do not or have less legal 
negative consequences. As a comparison, in South Africa, the insolvency practitioner can be an 
attorney but it need not be one or have a legal qualification. A professional having expertise 
from another sphere will tend to perceive things differently and might implement policies 
which provoke legal risks. As a result, it can be proposed that South Africa provides that the 
insolvency specialist should have a legal background preferably and if it not, the person should 
have adequate experience in other related insolvency areas. Such a recommendation would 
ensure that even if there is any dispute arising from the practitioner and the directors, the 
bankruptcy specialist can substantially back his suppositions due to his qualifications and/or 
expertise, especially by explaining how a legal contravention can impact damagingly the 
company reputation and the rescue regime. The justifications to be provided will diminish the 
differences between the parties. 
 
Also, there are advisors who are appointed to make recommendations based on their area 
of specialisation, with regards to the corporations’ circumstances. With different professionals 
with various fields of expertise, the managers with have more appropriate solutions to improve 
the financial health of the company compared to the insolvency practitioner who although is 
acquainted to several fields of the insolvency law, does not possess the requisite expertise in all 
the relevant fields. It is an option that South Africa considers a move from the administrator 
having the full control over the corporate management towards a system where the directors are 
entitled the same prerogatives but certain dealings transacted by them require the approval of 
the Court and the advice of competent experts in the specific field, as required on a case to case 
basis, instead of having a practitioner with wide and discretionary powers. 
 
5.3.2 Creditors’ power 
Like all the jurisdictions considered earlier in the research project, even in United States, 
the management focus shifts from the benefits of the shareholders to that of creditors during the 
insolvency phase. It can be defended by the owners of the business that they are affected by 
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are entitled to remove the management from office. It can be concluded that there might be 
reservations on the part of directors to maximise the returns of the creditors at the detriment of 
the members of the distressed entity. 
 
By undertaking transactions recklessly, there is a risk that creditors will not get back their 
investments if the company falls in an aggravated financial downfall. The American 
bankruptcy laws do not cater for the penalisation of insolvent trading, there is also no liability 
on directors in case of fraudulent trading.418 This theory goes more in line with the protection 
of the directors’ judicious decision making ability and the promotion of the business judgement 
rule. However it can be argued that creditors being the most affected by any fraudulent 
transactions, can have recourse to safeguard their rights through contract.419 The legal 
instrument enables the creditors to protect their rights sufficiently during the restructuration 
process; together with the board of directors converging its actions towards the safeguard of the 
returns of the shareholders and creditors as per their fiduciary and contractual duty. It is worth 
noting that there is a mechanism provided in Section 155 of the South African Companies Act 
whereby a compromise can be reached between the entity and its’ creditors as an alternative to 
the rescue process.420 This compromise can be entered irrespective of the solvency situation of 
the entity, except if the creditors have expressly opted for a rescue proceeding.421  
 
By way of conclusion, it can be said that since the creditors’ committee can influence 
some of the managerial decision making processes, it means that they are better empowered to 
secure the protection of their rights through the period the company is placed under business 
rescue proceedings. This ensures that the party which is the most aggrieved by the reputational 
loss suffered by the entity, can be actively involved in strategic planning to ensure that they can 
limit their damages. As advanced previously, the South African regulation can provides for 
more powers of creditors which will lessen the powers of practitioner. This change will can 
result in directors being induced to help the administrator, given that they both have equal 
powers with respect to the way the rescue proceedings will proceed. 
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5.3.3 Limited powers of supervisor 
As mentioned earlier, the supervisor is considered to be like an administrator with limited 
powers which implies that the directors are not explicitly required to follow the orders of the 
trustee. There is the risk that the measures proposed by the trustee which has not been abided 
by the management were essential for the rescue proceedings. Subsequently it might lead to an 
inefficient reorganisation plan, due to the fault of the directors and the trustee being unable to 
impose its’ prerogatives. But on the other hand, limited powers of the supervisor would imply 
that the latter cannot sack remove the directors from office. With this threat of removal is 
eliminated, the managers will be more willing to assist the supervisor whenever it is required. 
As such, it can be said that curtailing the powers of the practitioner in the South African legal 
framework can lead diminish the jeopardy of conflicts arising between the supervisor and the 
directors. 
 
5.3.4 Duty of good faith 
The South African provision expressly stipulates that a director should perform his duties 
in good faith.422 As such there is an express duty on part of the management to undertake 
dealings in good faith. If the director fails to prove his good faith due to insufficient evidential 
proof, he will be subject to harsh penalties and even removal from office. After being dismissed 
from the company, directors being the most resourceful persons from which the business rescue 
practitioner can obtain information from, will be reluctant to assist the insolvent professional 
which might lead to a poor rehabilitation mechanism. If the principle adopted in the United 
States is applied by South Africa, in the way that good faith is implied and it not expressly 
instructed to be followed, the evidential burden will be less by the directors to prove their noble 
intentions. With this approach, directors will be encouraged to make business judgements and 
decision without the fear of being questioned about the logic behind the strategy formulation. 
Nonetheless, it should be highlighted that the effectiveness of the American business 
judgement rule advocates that ‘reasonable diligence and care have been exercised’.423 Thus it 
can be deduced that only competent directors can seek remedy under this defence, which is also 
the case in South Africa.424 
                                                 
422 Section 76(3)(a). 





 Research Project: Ashirah B. Kaudeer 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis researched into the question of whether the duties and powers provided by the 
South African law during the business rescue proceedings would lead to conflicts with respect 
to the duties and powers of the directors. 
 
It can be concluded that from the Companies Act 1973 to the current Act 2008, there has 
been a move from management displacement to a tendency towards a debtor company in 
possession, although we are far from having such kind of regime. We have analysed whether 
the present statutory provisions might cause frictions between the business rescue practitioner 
and the directors since both of them form part of the management during the period the 
reorganisation proceedings of the distressed entity have been initiated. 
 
In this research project we have considered that the practitioner having the effective 
managerial control whilst the directors having a lesser control over the directorial powers 
during the corporate rehabilitation period which could lead conflicts between the two parties. 
The risk of frictions between the parties can be felt when the practitioner might require the 
assistance of the managers of the distressed corporation in order to have an overview of the 
internal operations of the business or to have the latter’s guidance about the whereabouts of the 
records and the provision of relevant documents, base on which the practitioner will proposed 
strategic policies. With different aims, focus, motivations, perceptions and expertise, the 
management will be reluctant to assist the practitioner accordingly. Consequently, there will be 
possibility of distortions in the flow of information which will in turn result in the important 
data not properly taken into consideration, leading to an inefficient restructuring regime which 
can lead to the winding up of the company. 
 
We have subsequently compared the similar statutory provisions of Australia, United 
Kingdom and the United States respectively. Based on these provisions, juxtaposed to those 
ones stipulated in the South African legal framework, we have made some recommendations. 
One of the proposals is that the creditors of the distressed entity, who are the most affected by 
the business failure, should be given the power to supervise the way the administration is being 
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whereby the creditors can decide on the privileges to be empowered to the practitioner and 
directors during the corporate reintegration period. Further it has been advanced that both the 
interests of creditors and shareholders are to be prioritised instead of having the alternate option 
of promoting only the benefits of one of these parties. 
 
Given the wide powers of practitioners during the business rescue process in South 
Africa, it has been suggested that if an affected party is not convinced with the justifications of 
the choice of strategies, it should be entitled to apply to court for judicial review. A provision in 
that respect, stipulating that at any aggrieved stakeholder has the right to apply to court to ask 
for the review of the decision made by the bankruptcy specialist. However the court will have 
to ensure that the interests of the applicant or plaintiff were seriously affected. Even if South 
Africa has not adopted the mechanism whereby the management still has full directorial 
control, maybe the legal framework should be drafted in such a way as to encourage directors 
to improve the financial position of the company and when they are unable to do so, as a last 
resort to appoint the practitioner who will assist them. 
 
In light of the above propositions, it is also to be noted that South African should 
undertake thorough investigation on the applications of these policies in the respective foreign 
jurisdictions. Identical legal transplantation can prove to be disastrous if they are implemented 
without due enquiry. The countries which we have considered in the course of the research 
have different economic and social climate and the national legal framework also varies. 
Therefore South Africa should research how it can best modify and apply those 
recommendations. Accordingly, it will benefit from both the advantages of having the expertise 
of the practitioner who is better placed to save the company from liquidation coupled with the 
benefit of still forming part of the directorial control by retaining the privileges of actively 
participate in the decision making process. As a result, there will be less risk of frictions and 
frustrations arising between the practitioner and management, leading to an effective and 
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